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Chapter 2
Eternal Land Rights? Interaction of Land 
Rights in the SADC
 
2.1. Introduction
The question what, if any, was the nature of title to real property in the 
SADC prior to colonial experience of States parties is a compound question 
because in order to answer it fully, we may need also to answer several 
other questions that it triggers off. They include the following: 
1) How were pre-colonial land rights determined and to what effect?
2) What was the legal effect upon their interaction with new rights 
introduced under colonial rule?
3) Is there such a thing under international law as a perpetual, claim to 
land? If there is, what is its basis and does it deserve and should it 
be privileged above every other claim?
Yet to gain as full an appreciation of the land issue, and in order to discover 
a model for resolving this and similar issues that are rooted in colonial or 
some  such  other  similar  experience  of  States,  we  must  ask  the  former 
compound question. The thorny issue in the SADC land issue is whether 
there is among the competing claims to title to land one that could, and 
should  be  honoured  ahead  of  the  others.  Even  if  such  a  title  could  be 
determined, perhaps the question is no longer one of honouring it ahead of 
its rivals, but one of extinguishing the policy of unequal access to land and 
land redistribution. Restoration of land to the one with the best title is a 
separate issue with an entirely different set of dynamics, goals and outcome 
from that of land redistribution. The former is about competition and battle 
among holders of different titles to the same land. They must do combat in 
the forum determined by policy makers, in order to prove that theirs is the 
unassailable claim. The outcome is either victory or loss with the winner 
taking  all.  Those  beaten  to  the  prize  face  social  humiliation  and  even 
economic  ruin,  depending  on  their  personal  circumstances.  The  latter 
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merely  accepts  that  at  a  particular  point  in  time,  the  status  quo,  for 
whatever reason is no longer sustainable. The status quo itself becomes a 
threat to national peace, security and stability. Such a realisation may have 
been  inspired  by  economic,  social  or  political  realities  of  the  State.  It 
resembles more or less Rawls’ point of genesis where a community gathers 
together  to  write  the  (new)  rules  that  shall  regulate  property  rights 
henceforth.  Its  dynamics  are  more  favourable  than  those  of  the  former 
paradigm in that theoretically there are no losers because everyone ends up 
with an equal opportunity and the possibility of an equal share as anyone 
else. The outcome favours unity and progress compared to the former. 
A  finding  that  pre-colonial  SADC  communities  adhered  to  a 
system of land rights of any description would raise two further questions. 
The  first,  is  what  occurred  to  those  rights  in  the  period  between 
colonization and the emergence of the land issue in affected SADC States? 
Did they suddenly disappear? If so by what process? Or did they undergo 
some  metamorphic  change?  If  so,  to  become  what?  What  holds  the 
consequent order of that metamorphic change together? Why has it failed 
to prevent or even cope with the land issue? Does that metamorphic process 
hold  the  key  to  the  solution  to  the  land  issue?  If  there  indeed  was  a 
metamorphic change, are the current land disputes an inevitable equal and 
opposite reaction for the restoration of some balance? The second, refers to 
validation of the transformation of native Africans’ land rights after their 
conquest  by  empire  nations  of  Europe.  What  validated  that  process? 
Ultimately sovereign States are accountable to no other authority than that 
of  international  law.  If  international  law  acquiesced  with  alienation  of 
natives from their  land by the settler communities,  is  it  still  possible to 
imagine that it  (international law) should have the final say on the land 
issue in  affected SADC States given its  appaling record on the  matter? 
Where does that leave the corpus of domestic law within affected SADC 
States that was used forcibly to expropriate natives of their land? 
2.2. Legitimacy deficit in individual titles to commercial farmland 
in the SADC
The  question  whether  a  legitimacy  deficit  resides  in  claims  of  various 
parties  to  title  to  what  is  now called  commercial  farmland  in  troubled 
SADC  States  raises  complex  historical,  legal  and  theoretical  matters. 
Nonetheless, it should be raised because of its potential to inform the scope 
of the land issue in SADC States. 
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Common  Law  jurisdictions  favour  the  view  that  pre-existing 
property rights persist even after conquest. In The Case of Tanistry (1608)1
it was held that the British Crown did not take actual possession of land by 
reason of conquest. The Privy Council in  In re Southern Rhodesia2 held 
that upon asserting sovereignty, the British Crown accepted the existing 
property rights of the natives. Lord Sumner stated that it must be presumed, 
in  the  absence  of  express  confiscation  or  of  subsequent  expropriatory 
legislation, that the conqueror has respected pre-existing native rights and 
forborne  to diminish or modify them. Lord Denning re-affirmed the same 
principle in  Oyekan v Adele.3 He stated that in inquiring “what rights are 
recognised, there is one guiding principle. It is this: The Courts will assume 
that the British Crown intends that the rights of property of the inhabitants 
are to be fully respected”.  In Mabo and Others v. State of Queensland4 The 
High Court of Australia declared the following: “Whatever the justification 
advanced in earlier days for refusing to recognise the rights and interests in 
land  of  the  indigenous  inhabitants  of  settled  colonies,  an  unjust  and 
discriminatory doctrine of that kind can no longer be accepted”.
Nonetheless, Classical International Law recognizes five modes by 
which a State legitimately could acquire sovereignty over territory, namely, 
cession, occupation, accretion, subjugation and prescription.5 Oppenheim 
writes that, subjugation, also called title by conquest, is the acquisition of 
territory by conquest followed by annexation. This mode of acquiring title: 
… had to be accepted into the scheme … in the period when making of 
war was recognized as a sovereign right, and war was not illegal. Simple 
title by subjugation has always been relatively rare, because victors more 
usually  enforced  a  treaty  of  cession.  In  any event,  war  waged for  the 
purpose of the acquisition of territory has probably been unlawful since 
Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant.6
Two treaties between Chief Lobengula and representatives of the British 
Government,  conferring privileges  and rights to  the British Government 
over Matebeleland and Mashonaland, and developments thereafter favour 
1 Davis 28, 80 E.R. 516.
2 [1919] A.C. 211 at 233.
3 [1957] 2 All E.R. 785 at 788.
4 See Mabo and Others v. State of Queensland, Australian Law Reports, 107 
(1992), p.1. Per Brennan J.
5 Brownlie,  I.  (5th ed  1998)  Principles  of  Public  International  Law,  Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, p. 130.
6 Oppenheim’s International Law, (Watts, A. and Jennings, R., eds. 9th ed. 1992), 
Longman, London/New York, pp.698-699.
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the  view  that  the  colonization  of  Southern  Rhodesia  occurred  through 
cession rather than conquest. First, on 11 February 1888, and to prevent the 
Boers and the Portuguese from frustrating British hopes in Matabeleland 
and Mashonaland, Moffat and Chief Lobengula signed a treaty whereby 
Lobengula undertook that, “… he would have no dealings with any foreign 
power without the previous knowledge and sanction of the (British) High 
Commissioner (for South Africa – Sir Hercules Robinson)”.7  Second, on 
30 October 1888 Lobengula put his signature to the Rudd Concession. 
By  its  terms,  he  gave  Rudd  and  Rudd’s  associates  “complete  and 
exclusive  charge”  over  all  minerals  located  within  his  dominions, 
“together with full power to do all that they may deem necessary to win 
and procure the same” – a vague phrase which might refer to such things 
as the making of a road and the importation of mining machinery, but 
which might  possibly  be  stretched to  cover  the  enforcement  of  public 
order  within  the  area  operations.  …..  In  return,  he  was  to  receive  a 
payment  of  £100  each  lunar  month  (£1,300  a  year),  and  was  to  be 
supplied with 1,000 Martini-Henry breech-loading rifles – not  ordinary 
cheap  muzzle-loading  trade  guns  –  together  with  100,000  rounds  of 
cartridges to fit them.8
Cession of State territory is the transfer of sovereignty over State territory 
by the owner-State to another State.9 Effective cession depends on whether:
1) It was intended that  sovereignty  will pass. Acquisition of governmental 
powers,  even  exclusive,  without  an  intention  to  cede  territorial 
sovereignty, will not suffice.10
2) An agreement was reached, normally in the form of a treaty between the 
ceding and the acquiring State; or indeed between several States including 
the ceding and the cessionary States.11 and whether:
3) the  treaty  of  cession  passes  the  test  set  in  Article  52  of  the  Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties which makes void all treaties procured 
by the threat or use of force in violation of principles of international law 
7 Hanna, A. J. (1960) The Story of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland”, Faber and Faber 
Ltd., London, pp.78-9.
8 Ibid. pp. 81-2.
9 Oppenheim’s International Law, (Watts, A. and Jennings, R., eds. 9th ed. 1992), 
Longman, London/New York, p679.
10 Ibid. p.680
11 Ibid.
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embodied in the Charter of  the United Nations.12 Earlier treaties being 
subject to the principle of inter-temporal law.13
The question of intention is always one of inference because while human 
behaviour  is  vulnerable  to  human observation,  thinking  is  not.  For  this 
reason, inference is always a risky business. It is not surprising that there is 
no unity among historians, whether by the terms of the Rudd Concession, 
Lobengula intended to pass sovereignty to the British.14 
Factual misunderstandings between the settler authorities and the 
native leaders oppose the land titles that resulted. For instance, the British 
Government’s dealings with Chief Lobengula whom they wrongly believed 
to be in control of Mashonaland15 facilitated the grant to the British South 
Africa  Company  on  29  October  1889,  a  Royal  Charter  to  administer 
Southern Rhodesia.  Clause III of the charter authorized the Company to 
“… exercise such powers of jurisdiction and government as it might “from 
time to time” in future acquire “by any concession, agreement,  grant or 
treaty””.16 Even  more,  it  emboldened the  Company’s  resolve  to  occupy 
Mashonaland,  even  without  Lobengula’s  authority  as  the  royal  charter 
required.  In  September,  1890,  the  British  South  Africa  Company,  after 
journeying north-east to avoid clashes with Lobengula’s army, stopped just 
south of Mount Hampden, hoisted the Union jack, and built a fort which 
they named in honour of Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister  of Britain. 
12 Ibid.
13 For discussion of inter-temporal law see Elias, T.O. (1980) “The Doctrine of 
Inter-temporal Law”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 74 p.285; Shaw, 
M. N. (4th ed. 1997) International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
pp.346-7. 
14 See Gann, L.H. (1965) A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early days to 1934, 
1965, Chatto and Windus, London, pp.78-9; 86-7.
15 After the conclusion of the treaty of 11 February 1888 with Lobengula, British 
Foreign secretary and Prime Minister Lord Salisbury stated:  “… Her Majesty’s 
Government  have  satisfied  themselves  that  Lo  Bengula,  with  whom they  have 
concluded  a  treaty,  is  the  undisputed  ruler  over  Matabeleland  and 
Mashonaland”.Ibid. p.79. But Hanna writes that: “Lobengula did not govern the 
Mashona, did not trouble to intervene in their internal disputes,  did not protect 
them in the enjoyment of any rights whatever. If a village was left unmolested for a 
time, it was ‘only being kept to fatten, much as a pig is kept, before it may be 
thought time to raid. To regard marauding as equivalent to jurisdiction may have 
been diplomatically convenient, but it was morally reprehensible”. Hanna, A. J. 
(1960) The Story of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland”, Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 
pp.78-9.
16 Ibid. p.83.
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“Thus  began  the  capital  of  Mashonaland,  and  afterwards  of  Southern 
Rhodesia.”17 
1890 Southern Rhodesia was not terra nullius, neither was British 
occupation  characterized  with  subjugation.  In  a  poignant  metaphor 
Lobengula  himself  describes  to  Rev.  C.  D.  Helm the  process  by which 
Southern Rhodesia came under British rule. 
Did you ever see a chameleon catch a fly? The chameleon gets behind the 
fly and remains motionless for some time, then he advances very slowly 
and gently, first putting forward one leg and another. At last, when well 
within reach, he darts his tongue and the fly disappears. England is the 
chameleon and I am that fly.18
Oppenheim  writes  that  the  classical  scheme  of  separate  modes  of 
acquisition  of  territory  is  falling  into  disuse,  except  where  situations 
belonging to  former times come into question.19 This view is  consistent 
with the inter-temporal rule.20 The celebrated 1928 Award of Judge Huber 
in the Island of Palmas case21 is commonly credited with inspiring the new 
doctrine of acquisition of territory.22 The Southern Rhodesia case invokes a 
critical  date of  September  1890.  It  appears  therefore,  that  the  classical 
doctrine  of  acquisition  of  territory,  and  not  the  new  doctrine  applies. 
Nonetheless, even if the new doctrine were applied, consideration would 
still need to be given to “… proof of the exercise of sovereignty at the 
critical date or dates, and in doing so will not apply the orthodox analysis 
to describe its process of decisions”.23  Oppenheim concludes that, 
… The issue  depends,  therefore,  upon the  weight  to  be  attached  at  a 
critical date or period, itself a matter to be decided in relation to each 
particular case, to a variety of possible factors and considerations. These 
include  continued  and  effective  occupation  and  administration, 
acquiescence and/or protest, the relative strength or weakness of any rival 
claim, the effects of the inter-temporal law, the principle of stability in 
17 Ibid. p.87.
18 Ibid. p.81.
19 Oppenheim’s International Law, (Watts, A. and Jennings, R., eds. 9th ed. 1992), 
Longman, London/New York, p. 708.
20 See Brownlie, I. (5th ed. 1998) Principles of Public International Law, (5th ed. 
1998), Oxford University Press), pp.126-8.
21 Island of Palmas Case, (Netherlands v. U.S. (1928), Permanent Court of  
Arbitration. Sole Arbitrator: Huber. 2 R.I.A.A.829.
22 See Harris, J. (5th ed. 1998) Cases and Materials on International Law, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, pp. 190-263.
23 Brownlie, I. Supra. note 20. p.129. (Emphasis added)
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territorial title and boundaries, regional principles such as  uti-posidetis, 
geographical  and  historical  factors,  the  attitudes  of  the  international 
community, and the possible requirements of self-determination, and also 
indeed the possibly unlawful origin of the original taking of possession,  
and that subjugation is no longer per se a recognizable title. The weight 
to be given to these factors and considerations, in the assessment of the  
total  result  in  terms  of  a  consolidated  title,  will  vary  with  particular  
cases.24
Where the question arises as does in the present case, whether the situation 
at a particular time is decisive in determining title to property, the “critical 
date”  doctrine  applies.  The  Minquiers  and Ecrehos case25 has  helpfully 
clarified  the  meaning  and  application  of  the  doctrine.  Sir  Gerald 
Fitzmaurice  stated  that  the  doctrine  of  the  critical  date  enforces  today 
whatever was the position on the date identified as the critical date.
… Whatever were the rights of the Parties then, those are still the rights of 
the Parties now. If one of them still had sovereignty, it has it now, or is 
deemed to have it. If neither had it, then neither has it now… the whole 
point, the whole  raison d’être, of the critical date rule is, in effect, that 
time is deemed to stop at that date. Nothing that happens afterwards can 
operate to change the situation as it then existed. Whatever the situation 
was, it is deemed in law still  to exist; and the rights of the Parties are 
governed by it.26 
 
Mabo considered the question whether, and to what extent natives retained 
land rights after British colonization of Australia. Mabo argued that his title 
to  his  traditional  gardening  lands  on  Murray  Island  had  not  been 
superceded by British colonization of Australia. The Court ruled that:
1) the critical date of settlement was 1788, and at that time, Australia and its 
surrounding islands were not terra nullius or practically unoccupied,27 
2) because the mode of British colonization of Australia was not conquest, 
and no treaty had been entered that assigned natives’ property rights to the 
Crown, native title to land continued unaffected until it was extinguished 
by a valid act of the Crown that was inconsistent with the continued right 
of enjoyment of native title,28 and
24 Oppenheim’s International Law, (Watts, A. and Jennings, R., eds. 9th ed. 1992), 
Longman, London/New York, p.716. Emphasis added.
25 International Court of Justice Reports, 1953, p.47.
26 Ibid. p. 64.
27 Ibid. p.408.
28 Ibid.
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3) where  the  colonizer  through legislation  protects  or  reserves  traditional 
land rights, these reservations are an acknowledgment and re-enforcement 
of continuing native common law land rights or native title.29
Where territory is terra nullius, the occupying forces have no other rights 
to take notice of because no one else has rights over the land. But where a 
people have been conquered, the international convention of “conquest and 
continuity”  applies.  The  institutions,  laws  and  rights  of  the  conquered 
people  subsist  until  an  act  of  the  conqueror  changes  that  position.  The 
conqueror  can  always  extinguish  the  option  of  discontinuing  previous 
institutions and laws of his new subjects by recognizing them as valid.30
If the critical date for Zimbabwe is taken to be 1890 as has always been 
asserted,31 the question: what became of native rights to land they held and 
controlled prior to British colonization cannot be avoided. Native peoples’ 
rights  have  different  status,  origin  and  force  depending  on  how  the 
colonizing state acquired sovereignty over them.32 Where there is no full-
scale conquest as the term is traditionally understood, and cession is the 
mode of colonization, the native people of the occupied territory, through 
their  leaders  cede  sovereign  competence  in  exchange  for  other  rights, 
usually by way of treaty.33 Mabo asserts that in the absence of unequivocal 
cession of territory, all pre-existing native land rights continue. “This is an 
instance of the Court affirming the doctrine of consent: quod omnes tagit” 
34 meaning: “that which touches all must be agreed to by all” – humwe. This 
gives  the  view that,  native  rights  to  territories  that  became commercial 
farming zones in Zimbabwe may have persisted throughout colonization to 
the  present.  Tully  writes  that  where  natives  and  international  law both 
refute that conquest was the means by which the colonial administrators 
gained  control,  native  rights  persist  through  institutions  that  established 
those rights.35 To hold otherwise would serve to dispossess native peoples 
“…  of  their  property  rights,  forms  of  government,  and  authoritative 
29 Ibid. 
30 See Dodds, S. (1998) “Justice and Indigenous Land Rights”, Inquiry, 41 No.2 
p.187, at p.191.
31 See Ranger, T. O. (1967) Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-7: A Study in 
African Resistance, Heineman, London, pp.1-16;  Martin, D. and Johnson, P. 
(1981) The Struggle for Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, pp.vii; 
32 See Mabo and Others v. State of Queensland, Australian Law Reports, 107 
(1992), p.1. See also Oppenheim’s International Law, (Watts, A. and Jennings, R., 
eds. 9th ed. 1992), Longman, London/New York, pp.709-712.
33 Dodds, S. supra. note 30 at p.189.
34 Mabo and Others v. State of Queensland, Australian Law Reports, 107 (1992), 
p.1.
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traditions  without  so  much  as  an  argument”.36 If  this  is  correct,  then 
Southern Rhodesia and Rhodesia’s ostracised other - humwe, may still have 
a role to play in the resolution of Zimbabwe’s land crisis. However, humwe 
bestows inferior title compared to private property arrangements introduced 
under colonial rule. Holders of title under humwe have a limited title in two 
senses. First, their title to land is understood as a general right to use land. 
That right does not incorporate the right to deprive others of access to it, 
except by prior and continuing use. Individuals do not have property rights 
with  their  standard  attributes  of  exclusivity  and  free  transferability,  but 
merely trust authority to use the land as long as another is not using it.37 
Second, and not without controversy,  Mabo  suggests that  humwe title is 
extinguished once the colonial government declares new rights over land 
which  are  opposable  to  native  notions  of  land  rights.38 The  passing  of 
legislation creating private property titles for commercial farmland appears 
to  do  exactly  that.  But  the  Court  also  stated  that,  where  the  colonizer 
through legislation protects or reserves traditional land rights,  as did the 
1895 joint  declaration of  the  British Government  and the  British South 
Africa Company that 2.2 million acres of land should be reserved for native 
occupation  according  to  their  tribal  custom,  and  the  Southern  Rhodesia 
Government’s Land Apportionment Act (1930) which reserved 30 percent 
of agricultural land for the 1.1 million Africans; such legislation serves to 
acknowledge and to re-enforce continuation of native common law land 
rights, or native title. The latter argument of the Court is reconcilable to the 
former argument only if it is accepted also that native rights to land subsist 
only in  the  newly  designated  communal  lands,  but  not  in  the  land  that 
natives  held  prior  to  colonization.  That  way,  the  colonizers’  new  law 
supplants pre-colonial land rights of natives. This appears to be the view 
that  the  High  Court  of  Zimbabwe  took  recently  in  The  Commercial  
Farmers  Union  v.  Comrade Border  Gezi  and  others.39 But  overall,  this 
would conflict with the Minquiers and Ecrehos case40 critical date theory, 
35 Tully, J. (1994) “Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a Middle 
Ground”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 11 No.2 p.153 at 156.
36 Ibid.
37 In Mabo, the Court observed that native title holders could not sell or lease their 
interest in land, though it accepted that as a community, holders could pass the title 
from generation to generation. In other words power to inherit native title resides in 
belonging to that particular community.
38 Supra. n.68 pp. 21-2.
39 Case No. H.C. 3544/2000 HE. See http://www.samara.co.zw/cfu/courtorder.htm. 
A fuller consideration of this case occurs at Section 3(e), infra. pp.25-7; and at 
Appendix I, infra. pp.32-6.
40 International Court of Justice Reports, 1953, p.47. 
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previously stated in the Island of Palmas case.41 It would conflict also with 
the  inter-temporal  principle  which  holds  that  in  1890,  international  law 
placed  different  obligations  on  colonizers  to  natives  of  the  colonized 
territories depending on the mode of colonization. Therefore, the question 
no longer is whether individual land titles created during the era of forcible 
dispossession of natives subsist beyond independence, but what justice as 
fairness requires as an equitable and egalitarian way forward. Attempts to 
address this question are made difficult by an unstable context. To begin 
with, once a legal title has been created, it assumes a life of its own in the 
market  place.  Through  market  exchanges,  it  can  be  broken  down  into 
several  separate  “smaller”  interests.  It  can  be  enjoined  also  to  other 
interests. Therefore, it is possible that in many cases, people are no longer 
dealing with original titles. But even where titles have not altered, they may 
have changed hands not only through Inheritance law, but also through Sale 
of Property law, up to and including the last twenty years of Zimbabwe’s 
independence from Britain. In the era of globalization, where States are in 
competition with one another for investment and are constantly prostituting 
themselves to potential foreign investors, Zimbabwe is not the holy nun 
that  turns  away  opportunity  for  foreign  investment.  Several  farmers 
migrated to Zimbabwe after independence from Britain in 1980 and bought 
farms and set about farming. They have dealt with no other Zimbabwean 
government  apart  from  President  Mugabe’s  own  post  independence 
government,  paying  taxes  and  duties  to  that  government  and  that 
government alone. These farmers are not beneficiaries of colonization. On 
the  contrary  they  are  proactive  facilitators  of  Zimbabwe’s  post-
independence  development  program.  Therefore,  to  say  that  they  should 
forfeit to the State 50 percent of the land they hold title to without any 
compensation for the land itself, except for structural value that they may 
have  added  onto  the  farms42 is  comparable  only  to  the  initial  injustice 
during  colonization  of  forcibly  moving  natives  from  agro-ecological 
regions I and II and crowding them and their livestock in the low rainfall, 
infertile  drought  prone regions of  the country.43 If  no one else  deserves 
protection from President Mugabe’s “land grab” policy, this category of 
farmers who purchased land in good faith after Zimbabwe’s independence 
in 1980 ought not to have their titles diminished without prompt adequate 
efficient compensation whatsoever.
41 Island of Palmas Case, (Netherlands v. U.S. (1928), Permanent Court of  
Arbitration. Sole Arbitrator: Huber. 2 R.I.A.A.829.
42 Professor Jonathan Moyo, Spokesman for President Mugabe, BBC News 24, 
Live Interview, 3 May 2000, 20:00hrs.
43 See Tables 1, 2 and 3, infra.
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2.3. Relationship of natives to land before colonization
The relationship of  natives to their  environment was summed up in the 
philosophy of common heritage – humwe,44 by which every member of the 
tribal  group was presumed to have an inherent  right  not  only to earn a 
living off the land, but also to be supported by his kinsmen in his effort to 
live off the land. Thus, even those that were too poor to afford ploughing 
oxen and ploughing implements would prepare also for the rain season with 
the confidence that their neighbours would set aside a day in their calendar, 
when  they  would  all  converge  on  their  field,  to  do  all  the  ploughing 
necessary for the season, without charge - humwe. The same applied if for a 
good  reason  a  family  needed  assistance  with  weeding,  harvesting,  or 
transfer of their grain from the fields to the granaries.  This communal spirit 
extended to ownership, maintenance and exploitation of marine life, and 
other  wildlife.  Hunting  of  particular  species  of  animals  was  prohibited 
during their mating season. Certain species of animals were preserved,45 
and if anyone caught them by mistake, they had to report to their chief and 
surrender  the  catch  to  them.   While  individual  exploits  were  not 
uncommon,  and  individuals  were  encouraged  to  develop  individual 
expertise at something, the majority of exploits worth talking about were 
collectively  orchestrated.46 Thus,  hunting  parties  were  organized  and 
executed collectively. When a tribe was threatened with famine, a party of 
warriors was sent to a friendly neighbouring clan to secure enough food for 
all until the next harvest - humwe. Alternatively, an army of men was sent 
to go and plunder the resources of another clan, hence the attempt by some 
to portray colonialism as a virtue that often put an end to tribal wars. But 
those tribal wars confirmed also the property rights of one group in relation 
to  other  groups.  For  instance,  Ndebele  raids  into  Mashonaland  were 
targeted at seizing food stocks, beautiful young women, and livestock but 
not at territorial conquests. The Ndebeles always retreated to their territory 
in  the  west.  Those  tribal  wars  also  confirmed  property  rights  in  that 
alliances  were  formed  between  tribal  groups,  to  fend  off  threats  of 
aggressive and hostile tribes.
44 Literally translates to “us all”.
45 The pangolin is one example.
46 The Shona proverb Rume rimwe harikombi churu – “One man cannot single 
handedly surround an anthill” is core to the mindset of the Shona people of 
Zimbabwe. The Ndebele equivalent is Indhlovu kaibulawa ngomuntu oyedwa – 
“You cannot kill an elephant on your own”.
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The  common  heritage  view  of  land  –  humwe, persists  among 
Southern Africans to this day. Humwe is in direct opposition to selfishness 
- a vice long frowned upon and opposed by all cultures of African tradition. 
Lester writes that European Romantics first posited the Xhosa and later on 
the  Khoisan  tribes  of  South  Africa  as  “possessors  of  ideal  traits  that 
Europeans lacked – savage dignity, humility and communal selflessness”.47 
Landless  peasants  have  never  accepted,  and  will  not,  particularly  after 
achievement of political independence, accept that land from which they 
were  forcibly alienated can be owned in excess by a  handful  of  people 
while millions go without. It not only would be unnatural for them, but also 
make  a  mockery  of  their  well-documented  political  struggles  to  end 
colonial injustices on their territories. To do so would be to legitimate the 
injustice  of  colonial  annexation  of  their  land.  Ultimately,  it  would 
legitimate  their  own  dehumanisation.  According  to  Lester,  European 
conceptions of African tribes were not fixed. “Later accounts describe the 
Khoisan, by now dispossessed, as governed by caprice, products of nature  
just  like  the  other  flora  and  fauna  being  described,  catalogued  and 
dominated by the increasingly imperial European eye.”48 Lester observes 
that  accounts  that  described  geography  and  identified  flora  and  fauna 
structures  are  examples  of  “…  asocial  narratives  in  which  the  human 
presence is absolutely marginal, and as embodied in the naturalist suited 
Europeans  that  wanted  to  justify  their  authority”49 and  to  place  their 
legitimacy beyond contest  by  claiming that  land  they  now possess  was 
terra nullius when they settled themselves on it. Beinart50 writes that in pre-
colonial  South  Africa,  the  Bantu  speaking  African  people  that  had  for 
centuries made up the bulk of the country’s population did not penetrate the 
Cape Peninsula – one better-watered pocket of the west.  Non-use at the 
material  time  of  one’s  own  resources  does  not  justify  another’s 
presumption of authority over them. “Use” is also as subjective an idea as 
one  can  think  of.  With  regard  to  intergenerational  capital  such  as  land 
which one generation truly holds only in trust for the next generation, that 
trusteeship requires each generation not to abuse, squander or waste all of it 
so that future generations are left with remnants of what they could have 
had. Therefore, what appears to be land not in use at any time might be 
land being preserved for future generations’ use. What has precipitated the 
47 Lester, A. (1996) From Colonization to Democracy: A new historical geography 
of South Africa, Tauris Publishers, London/New York, p.22. (Emphasis added)
48 Ibid. (Emphasis added)
49 Ibid.
50 Beinart, W. (2001) Twentieth Century South Africa, Oxford University Press, 
p.10.
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land  issue  in  affected  SADC States  is  the  fact  that  land  allocation  and 
distribution today shows that one minority racial group legally holds land 
sufficient for the present generation and enough reserve for several future 
generations of their kindred to be bequeathed with virgin land while the 
present generation of the majority black community has no land to live off. 
For example, South Africa has a population of approximately 41 million 
people. Sixty thousand whites own eighty-five percent of South Africa’s 
prime commercial  agricultural  farmland.  This  amounts  to  approximately 
one hundred and twenty-three million hectares of which only ten million is 
under cultivation or other use.  In one sense landless peasants’ effort  to 
wrestle “idle land” from commercial farmers who hold it in excess is an 
attempt  at  kicking  away  the  indignity  that  comes  with  forcible 
dispossession and to restore their dignity as owners and holders of land. 
Beinart writes that  private land titles were imposed also over areas that 
were  still  occupied  by  African  communities  and  held  for  speculative 
purposes.51 In another sense it is an effort to humanise through humwe the 
commercial farmers who appear to be shackled by the chains of selfishness 
in that they hold most of South Africa’s prime agricultural production land, 
some of which is not used at all, while their fellow citizens go without. 
Beinart52 writes that South Africa is divided by the 20 inch or 500 mm 
rainfall line which runs from Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape through the 
middle  of  the  Free  State  into  the  Western  Transvaal.  Over  half  of  the 
country, most of it to the West of this line receives so little rainfall that it is 
difficult  to grow crops.  Prior  to  colonization the bulk of  the population 
lived  to  the  east  of  that  line.  However,  with  colonization,  they  were 
squeezed beyond it. Some tribes retained only 20 per cent of their original 
land. After over a century of repressing it, this philosophical and cultural 
clash of notions of property is now set to play itself out in spite of what 
colonial  laws  suggest  should  be  the  case.  Law’s  power  lies  in  its 
legitimacy,  by  which  is  meant  its  ability  to  pull  its  addressees  towards 
compliance. That the majority of inhabitants of Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
South Africa are strongly against the pattern of land distribution on racial 
lines suggests perhaps that reformulation of property rights is overdue in 
the SADC.
Besides  instituting  a  system  of  inequitable  land  distribution, 
conversion from oral to recorded governance, ushered in also the concept 
of private ownership of land that firmly opposes the philosophy that has 
characterized  land  use  in  pre-colonial  SADC  States  -  humwe.  Humwe 
requires that those holding land beyond their need/use should accept also 
51 Ibid. p.11.
52 Ibid. p.10.
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that the poverty of land of their fellow countrymen in the midst of their 
excess of it dehumanizes themselves. In such a situation,  humwe requires 
them to relieve their countrymen’s poverty of land by sharing with them the 
fertile, high rainfall land beyond their use but still held by them as their 
personal farmland.53 But the question must still be asked whether  humwe 
conferred property rights at law before colonization, and if so, what was the 
effect if any, of colonization on those rights? 
Franck defines legitimacy as a rule’s pull of its addressees towards 
compliance.54 By treating as his own land, that which another regards as 
their private property, the violator of assumed private rights to land asserts 
either that, the legal title presumed by that other does not exist at all, or that 
the violator holds a more superior title to the same property than anyone 
else.  People  that  have become known as  “squatters”  in  affected  SADC 
States  appear  to  be  asserting  that  the  legal  standard  that  separates 
communally held land from privately owned commercial land has lost its 
legitimacy  precisely  because  the  squatters  themselves  no  longer  regard 
themselves as excluded from the land by some binding rule of law. Instead, 
they regard themselves either  as co-holders of  title  to those commercial 
farmlands, or as holders of a superior title to those farmlands than anyone 
else.  Often,  rules  lose  legitimacy  when  they  are  perceived  by  their 
addressees  as  being  unjust.  Rawls  writes  that  justice  is  evidenced  by 
practice of principles which,
…  free  and  rational  persons  concerned  to  further  their  own  interests 
would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental 
terms  of  their  association.  These  principles  are  to  regulate  all  further 
53 Studies on land utilisation on large-scale commercial farms have shown that 5 
million hectares of land can be transferred from that sector to the squatters, without 
compromising  national  agricultural  production.  But  even  more  important,  the 
studies have shown that there is considerable under-utilization of arable land in the 
large-scale  commercial  farming  sector.  This  has  prompted  the  Government  of 
Zimbabwe to inquire into allowable farm size variable scale. No clear policy on 
this has been reached yet though the figure of 1,500 hectares is being floated as the 
maximum allowable size for a commercial farm in Natural Regions I and II. See 
Moyo, S. (1998) “The Political Economy of Land Redistribution in the 1990s”, 
Paper presented at the Centre of African Studies, University of London, SOAS and 
Britain  Zimbabwe  Society  Seminar  on  Land  Reform  in  Zimbabwe:  The  Way 
Forward, 11 March, p.10. 
54Franck,  T.  M.  (1988)  “Legitimacy  in  The  International  System”,  American 
Journal  of  International  Law,  82  p.705;  Franck,  T.  M.  (1990)  The  Power  of 
Legitimacy Among Nations, 1990, Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford.
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agreements;  they  specify  the  kinds  of  social  cooperation  that  can  be 
entered into and the forms of government that can be established.55
The  theory  of  justice  as  fairness  which  is  premised  on  a  hypothetical 
genesis of social ordering where from a position of equality, every member 
of  the  community  disinterestedly  participates  in  the  process  of  creating 
rules for regulation of all future transactions of the community is consistent 
also with the  theory of justice  as  mutual  advantage according to  which 
justice results from a social agreement that enhances the position of all the 
participants.56 Both theories are premised on communal agreement as the 
basis and point of departure regarding ordering of both private and public 
arrangements.  The  original  hypothetical  communal  agreement  to  ensure 
that if “p” occurs, then “x” must follow sets up agents of the community to 
expect particular outcomes all the time. Therefore, a mojor product of the 
hypothetical agreement is the expectation among agents that if  “p” then 
“x”.  That  expectation  obliges  agents  of  the  community  to  order  their 
conduct  in  a  socially  desirable  fashion,  that  desire  having  been  stated 
directly or implicitly in the hypothetical agreement. Circumstances where 
“x”  does not follow  “p” betray the hypothetical agreement and injustice 
appears to prevail over justice. Rawls writes that a veil of ignorance57 from 
which the community creates its rules results in legal principles that confer 
on  all  members  of  the  community  basic  rights  and  duties.58 By  these 
principles, 
… men decide in advance how they are to regulate their claims against 
one another and what is to be the foundation charter of their society. Just 
as  each  person must  decide by  rational  reflection  what  constitutes  his 
good, that is, the system of ends which it is rational for him to pursue, so a 
group of persons must decide once and for all what is to count among 
them as just and unjust. The choice which rational men would make in 
this hypothetical situation of equal liberty, assuming for the present that 
this choice problem has a solution, determines the principles of justice.59 
Impartial  justice  theorists  regard  “advantage”  as  application  by  men  of 
foresight for their own preservation, and a more contented life thereby, or a 
55 Rawls, J. (1994) “The Main idea of the Theory of Justice”, in Singer, P., Ethics, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.362.
56 See Cross, G. (2001)  “A Theory of Impartial Justice”, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, vol 21 No.1 pp.129-44.
57 Rawls, J. supra. n.55 at p.363.
58 Ibid. p.362.
59 Ibid. 
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fuller  idea  of  self-advancement  incorporating  the  individual’s  more 
complete achievement of their conception of the good. Cross60 writes that  “ 
… justice as mutual advantage digs itself in on the terms of an agreement 
whereby everybody can achieve it more fully than they otherwise could”. 
These attributes of equality and mutual advantage contemplated in both the 
theory of impartial justice and justice as fairness are wholly lacking in the 
processes that converted oral governance of pre-colonial SADC States to 
recorded governance during colonial rule. Nozick61 argues that justice in 
holdings  can only be  the  result  of  just  acquisition and just  transfers  of 
holdings, or rectification for unjust expropriations. Therefore, we ought to 
be  able  to  trace  the  justiceability  of  title  all  the  way  back  to  original 
acquisition.  Besides,  where  laws  that  define  man’s  relationship  to  his 
environment  privilege  the  concerns  of  the  community’s  minority  group 
over those of the majority the risk is created always that those laws will 
lose  their  humanistic  appeal,62 and  become  tools  of  violence  and 
oppression.  It  appears  that  existing  private  holdings  in  land  in  affected 
SADC States  cannot  be  justified  on  the  basis  of  any  liberal  theory  of 
justice. Therefore, there is no reason why they could not be re-examined. 
Dodds63 perceives  the  problem  as  one  of  misplaced  confidence  by 
contemporary liberals in the foundations of state institutions presented as 
examples of Western liberal democracy. She writes:
Contemporary  liberals  frequently  start  from  the  assumption  that  the 
institutions of Western liberal democracy are well grounded. Liberalism is 
concerned  to  defend  liberal  institutions  or  to  improve  those  parts  of 
specific  liberal  institutions  which  are  unjust  or  biased  against  some 
members of the State. In debate about justice towards indigenous peoples, 
however, there is need to question whether States with colonial histories 
are  built  upon  unjust  foundations  which  cannot  be  addressed  within 
existing  institutions  of  the  State.  …justice  towards  the  demands  of 
indigenous groups requires substantial acknowledgment and recognition 
60 Cross, G. supra. n. 56.
61 See Dodds, S. n.30 at p.195.
62 On  law’s  humanistic  appeal  see  Dyzenhaus,  D.  (1998)  Judging  the  Judges, 
Judging Ourselves,  Truth,  Reconciliation and the Apartheid Legal  Order,  1998, 
Hart Publishing, Oxford, p.vii.
63 For instance, Waldron presents the issue as an epistemical one that glorifies the 
injustice and its  perpetuation  because  but  for  it  (the injustice complained of), 
another people other than the British might have colonized Southern Rhodesia and 
created  worse  injustice  than  that  complained  of.  Further,  he  argues  that  such 
injustices can be superseded over time. See Dodds, S. supra. n.30 at p.195.
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of the values and institutions of the relevant indigenous group, which may 
not fall readily within the framework of existing institutions.64 
For  Kingsbury,65 land  disputes  represent  political  negotiations  about 
normative  matters.  However,  “…  the   question  of  which  concept  is 
applicable is often set up as the key threshold issue – its resolution is seen 
as a key to channelling argument, determining which structure of analysis 
and  legitimation  will  then  prevail,  and  thus  influencing  outcomes.”66 It 
appears  to  me that  in  any negotiation process  resides  a  power  dynamic 
between participants that affects outcomes and is resolved only at the end 
of the negotiation process. That dynamic is as important to the outcome of 
the negotiations as the subject of the negotiation itself. It is like the railway 
line (the medium) on which a tilting train will or will not run and if it runs, 
at what speed. In this sense it determines whether the train gets there or not, 
if it ever leaves at all. Therefore, discussion of land issues should devote 
equal attention to both the dynamic between stakeholders or participants 
and the content they are addressing particularly because of the medium’s 
potential  to  affect  outcomes.  Kingsbury’s  study  of  discourse  and 
jurisprudence of national courts and of quasi judicial organs of the United 
Nations on native peoples’ claims to land held by others suggests that there 
are five different conceptual structures employed by claimants. These are67:
1) human rights and non discrimination claims
2) minority claims
3) self-determination claims
4) historic sovereignty claims
5) native  peoples,  including claims based on treaties  or  other  agreements 
between native peoples and States
This  range  suggests  a  recognition  under  international  law  of  the 
overwhelming significance of native claims to title to land under others’ 
control. Jurisprudence68 shows that it represents also a huge dilemma about 
64 Ibid. p.187. 
65 Kingsbury, B. (1999) “Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of 
Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law”, in Alston, P. 
ed. Peoples’ Rights, Oxford University Press, pp.69-110.
66 Ibid. at 70.
67 Ibid at 169.
68 Discussing the Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada, 
167/1984 (26 March 1990) UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40); Apirana Mahuika et  
al. v New Zealand, 547/1993 (10 December 1992), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993; J.E. Länsman et al. v Finland 511/1992, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994); Lovelace Case (24/1977), see Chapter 4. 
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how  to  channel  claims  because  each  of  these  channels  may  make  a 
difference  to  legal  outcomes.  What  is  important  appears  not  to  be 
declaration of  this  range but  perhaps the  “political  discourse  and social 
patterns in some societies”69 because ultimately it is that which dictates the 
channel  through  which  claims  are  channelled.  The  Zimbabwe  situation 
shows that land claims are regarded perhaps as beyond negotiation or even 
adjudication.  Initially,  commercial  farmers  regarded  their  dispute  with 
peasants as a legal one, governed by property laws of Zimbabwe. However, 
as peasants ignored consecutive High Court rulings against their leaders, 
the  Government  and  the  Police  Commissioner,  and   as  judges  that  had 
handed those decisions down were forced into exile, it became clear that 
native claims to land were not negotiable. However, it is arguable that the 
human rights culture has emerged in the last half century as the dominant 
culture against which all action can be judged. Baxi70 writes that: 
Although  not  radically  ameliorative  of  here-and-now  suffering, 
international  human  rights  standards  and  norms  empower  peoples’ 
movements  and  conscientious  policy  makers  everywhere  to  question 
political practices. That, to my mind, is an inestimable potential of human 
rights languages, not readily available in the previous centuries. Human 
rights languages are all that we have to interrogate the babarism of power. 
The structures of land law prevailing in most SADC States herald largely 
from the colonial era. In Zimbabwe for instance, The Land Apportionment 
Act  (1930)  reserved  30  percent  of  agricultural  land  for  the  1.1  million 
Africans, and 51 percent for the 50,000 whites. The Land Husbandry Act 
(1951)  enforced  private  ownership  of  land  while  the  Land  Tenure  Act 
(1969) reinforced land classification into African and European areas. By 
these acts,  Africans, who were not equally represented in the legislative 
process  were  forcibly  removed  from  their  traditional  lands,  without 
compensation. By 1976, a total of 4.5 million Africans were crowded in the 
infertile,  low rainfall  TTLs.71 In South Africa,  four  pieces of  legislation 
Discussing Mabo and Others v. State of Queensland, Australian Law Reports, 107 
(1992), p.1; Minquiers and Ecrehos cas, International Court of Justice Reports, 
1953, p.47 and the Starrett case, Harris, D. J. (5th ed. 1998) Cases and Materials 
on International Law, Sweet and Maxwell, London, p.555, see infra.
69 Kingsley, B. (1999) “Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of 
Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law”, in Alston, P. 
ed. Peoples’ Rights, Oxford University Press, pp.69-110.
70 Baxi, U. (2002), The Future of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, p.2.
71 “The Zimbabwe Land Question in Perspective”, Zimbabwe High Commission, 
Summary of Commissioner’s discussion with Tim Sebastian of BBC News 24 , 
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appeared  effectively  to  formalise  ownership  and  possession  of  land 
according to race. The first is the 1913 Natives Land Act, which had the 
effect of entrenching the unequal distribution of land between the races, 
and  made  the  segregation  of  races  an  ideal  to  be  pursued  by  future 
governments.  The  next  two  pieces  of  legislation  came  from the  PACT 
government following its election in 1924. The 1926 Masters and Servants 
Law (Transvaal and Natal) Amendment Act and the 1932 Native Service 
Contracts had the  common effect  of  pooling all  Africans  outside of  the 
reserves into the agricultural economy, while extending existing controls 
over labour tenancy. The fourth is the 1936 Native Trust Land Act which 
formalised African reserve areas and the eviction of black tenants from 
farms  for  the  next  fifty  years.  This  resulted  in  whites  securing  for 
themselves approximately 87 per cent of land and blacks approximately 13 
per cent.72 There is an ancient African proverb which says that “The one 
dishing  out  food does  not  allocate  himself  a  small  portion”.  Continued 
existence of the effect of these pieces of legislation, which were vigorously 
pursued  by  successive  colonial  and  racist  governments,  is  what  has 
precipitated in Zimbabwe the backlash against commercial farmers by the 
landless  peasants,  albeit  with  governmental  encouragement  purely  for 
political gain. Similar trouble looms over South Africa unless the problem 
is constructively deconstructed. 
Anthropology shows that, for a long time different cultures have 
held different notions of land rights. Upon colonization, land formed the 
fulcrum  of  an  unpredictable  political  control  because  of  its  double 
signification  to  the  disjointed  community  that  resulted.  Europeans 
perceived  land  commercially  as  detachable  property  because  it  started 
legally  to  be  registered  as  such,  while  natives  tended  to  regard  it  as 
undetachable  property,  and  also  as  the  medium  in  which  ancestor  and 
descendant  interpenetrate.  Accordingly, settler Governments had to walk 
the tightrope between the legal acquisition of registered land and the legal 
protection of symbolic bodily land.73  Abramson74 writes that:
…   the  ancestral  body  of  land  to  which  any  given  patriclan  belongs 
physically colonises all of the potentially separate bodies of the descent 
group  ...  Fijians  observe,  that  the  economic  separation  of  land  and 
April 2000, p.1.
72 The precise figures are a matter of dispute. See Beinart, W (2001) Twentieth 
Century South Africa, Oxford University Press, p.10.
73 See Abramson, A. (1999)  “Dialetics of Localization: The Political Articulation 
of Land Rites and Land Rights and Land Rights in the Interior of Eastern Fiji 
(1874 –c. 1990)”, History and Anthropology, 11 No.4  p.437 at p.439.
74 Ibid. p.447.
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patriclan  in  a  market  environment,  where  ritual  assimilation  to  some 
chiefly body-politic is lacking, disembodies land and tears the ancestrally 
collectivised body of the patriclan apart. Land in this threatened state, is 
said to have lost its “soul” or yalo. Typically, Fijians speaking English say 
that, when land passes onto the market, they lose their “identity”. … In 
the relevant medical economy of land, human illness is perceived to be an 
automatic  consequence of land alienation. Subsequently,  only a certain 
kava  drinking ritual is capable of refurbishing life-giving links with the 
ancestral  vu. And,  even  then,  an  appeasement  of  the  now-malevolent 
ancestor is not guaranteed. … Illnesses that are linked to the sale of land, 
and that are put down to the calamitous alienation of descendants from 
their ancestral origin, are termed mate ni vanua, “sickness of the land”. 
Therefore,  legal  title  to  property  insisted  upon  by  Western  notions  of 
official  records is  not  the  only way by which societies determined land 
rights. Moreover, when the British colonized Fiji, attempts were made to 
determine pre-established native territories and not to interfere with them, 
and  to  declare  government  land  all  those  territories  not  claimed by  the 
mataliqi.75 This  contrasts  sharply  with  the  their  approach  in  Southern 
Rhodesia where people were forcibly driven away from land targeted for 
commercial  farming  production  regardless  of  the  fact  that  land  was 
communally  owned,  and  its  use  supervised  by  the  chieftainships  of 
different  kingdoms  through  their  headmen.  In  fact,  1890  Zimbabwe 
comprised several kingdoms, including the Ndebele kingdom located in the 
south-west,  the  Manyika  located in  the  east  of  Zimbabwe,  the  Karanga 
located  in  the  South  and  the  Zezuru  located  in  central  and  northern 
Zimbabwe. Rural Zimbabwe manifests this demographic distribution to this 
day.
2.4. Land  distribution  in  SADC  States  at  the  turn  of  the  21st 
Century 
At  Zimbabwe’s  independence  from  Britain  in  1980,  6,000  commercial 
farmers owned 46.5 percent of all arable land, more than half of it in the 
high  rainfall  agro-ecological  regions  where  potential  for  agricultural 
production  is  greatest.  8,500  black  farmers  held  5  percent  of  the 
agricultural land situated mostly in the drier agro-ecological regions. 4.3 
million people occupied 49.3 per cent of the agricultural land, 75 percent of 
which is located in the drier agro-ecological regions where the soils are 
75 Ibid. pp.440-442.
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poorest.76 Between 1980 and 1990, the Zimbabwe Government acquired 
3,5 million hectares on a willing-buyer/willing-seller basis as required by 
the negotiated Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 which ended the 16 
year  civil  war  for  independence  of  Rhodesia,  and  resettled  71,000 
households.  Apart  from  the  British  Government,  which  provided  £44 
million, no other donors have funded land acquisition. However, in 1990, 
aid to Zimbabwe for purposes of resettling landless black Zimbabweans 
stopped  completely.77 Britain  is  now channeling  all  its  aid  through  the 
private sector and non-governmental  organizations and has  promised £5 
million  over  three  to  five  years  to  help  the  rural  poor.78 In  1992,  the 
Government of Zimbabwe passed the Land Acquisition Act to make way 
for compulsory acquisition of land. Legal challenges of its applicability to 
specific  situations  mean that  its  impact  is  yet  to  be  fully  realized.  The 
current  position  is  that  4,000  large-scale  commercial  farmers 
(predominantly  white)  own  11,2  million  hectares.  More  than  1  million 
communal area families occupy 16,3 million hectares, mainly in drier and 
less fertile agro-ecological regions. 10,000 small- scale commercial farmers 
occupy  1,2  million  hectares.  70,000  families  have  been  resettled  on  2 
million hectares. State owned farms amount to 0,5 million hectares. The 
Zimbabwe Government seeks to resettle a further 150,000 families on at 
least  5  million  hectares  which  only  the  large-scale  commercial  farming 
community  can  provide  -  humwe.  In  its  publications,  the  commercial 
farmers union79 states that it fully supports the land reform programme in 
Zimbabwe80 and  actively  participates  nationally  and  internationally  in 
conferences on the issue. 
76 “The Zimbabwe Land Question in Perspective”, Zimbabwe High Commission, 
Summary of Commissioner’s discussion with Tim Sebastian of BBC News 24 , 
April 2000, p.2.
77 See “How Mugabe abused Backing from Britain”, The Times, 19th April, 2000, 
p.5.
78 Ibid.
79 Established in 1942, this voluntary union describes its principal objective as the 
representation, protection and advancement of the interests of its members and the 
furtherance  of  the  development  of  an  economically  viable  and  sustainable 
agricultural industry.
 See http://www.samara.co.zw/cfu/about.html. (visited 03/03/01)
80 See Statement by Mr. T. K. Henwood, President of the Commercial Farmers’ 
Union, http://www.samara.co.zw/cfu/FARMINVASIONS.htm#29march. (visited 
3/3/00)
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2.5. Humwe, Colonization, Land Rights: National Courts Step in
In  The Commercial Farmers Union v. Comrade Border Gezi and others81 
the High Court of Zimbabwe appeared to reject international law’s notion 
of enduring native rights to property. The Court’s ratio precluded inquiry 
into  the  legality  of  the  dispossession  of  natives  of  their  land  by  their 
colonisers and their dumping in agriculturally sterile zones of the country.82 
This raises the question whether what a robber plunders and keeps long 
enough permanently becomes his, so that when the owner is able to claim it 
back,  the  robber  can  turn  to  the  Courts  to  deny  his  victim of  what  is 
correctly his. The High Court of Zimbabwe ordered that:
1) Every occupation of any property listed in the Schedule hereto or of any 
other  commercial  farm or  ranch  in  Zimbabwe  that  has  been  occupied 
since February 16 2000 in pursuit of any claim to a right to occupy that 
property as part of the demonstrations instigated, promoted or encouraged 
by any person, is hereby declared unlawful.
2) All  persons who have taken up occupation of any commercial farm or 
ranch in Zimbabwe since February 16 2000 in pursuit of any claim to a 
right  to  occupy  that  property  as  part  of  the  recent  demonstrations 
instigated, promoted or encouraged by any person shall vacate such land 
within 24 hours of the making of this Order.
3) The  first  three  Respondents  should  not  encourage,  allow or  otherwise 
participate  in  any  demonstration  in  protest  against  the  holding  of 
commercial farming or ranching land in Zimbabwe according to the race 
of the present owners or occupiers….
In one sense,  this  approach of the Court  fuels the argument that  where 
native claims to land now under other people’s control is concerned, justice 
cannot  be  achieved  without  adopting  a  formula  that  substantially 
acknowledges  and  embraces  the  values  and  institutions  of  the  native 
population. Yet these values and institutions may not readily fall under the 
framework of existing state structures. Therefore, “… attempts to redress 
injustice towards indigenous groups which do not question the justice of 
existing state institutions will therefore prove to be inadequate responses to 
indigenous people’s demands for substantive justice.”83 In another sense, 
this decision casts the Court as a mature legal institution, fully aware of its 
juristic  function.  The  Court  is  constrained  by  the  principle  of  non-
81 Case No. H.C. 3544/2000 HE. See http://www.samara.co.zw/cfu/courtorder.htm. 
(visited 3/4/01)
82 Supra. tables 2 and 3.
83 Dodds, S. n. 30 p.187.
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retroactivity from applying norms of law created after the breach at issue 
occurred. In this case it was alleged that the “squatters” had breached the 
law of trespass by setting up camps on private farms without invitation or 
authorization  of  the  landowners.  In  this  sense,  the  Court  could  be 
congratulated  on  its  decision  to  consider  only  the  legal  issue  (trespass) 
under the laws of trespass in force at the time that offence was committed. 
The decision also helps to define a way forward in that it rejects violent 
conquests relied upon by colonizers of the late 19th Century to expropriate 
natives of their property as unacceptable to the modern humanistic climate 
desired  by  the  international  community’s  fervent  push  for  a  culture  of 
human rights. International law insists that upon appropriation by a State of 
private property, prompt adequate and efficient compensation must follow. 
In  the  Iran-US  Claims  Tribunal84 the  tribunal  granted  an  interlocutory 
award  upon  the  determination  that  there  had  been  a  “taking  of  the 
claimant’s  property,”  and  appointed  experts  to  calculate  the  loss.  The 
Starrett case85 has helpfully defined “property” and  “taking of property.” 
A taking may be effected by transfer of title by law, as in the typical case of 
nationalisation  or  of  the  expropriation  of  land.  The  physical  seizure  of 
property may suffice, as may its transfer under duress or by confiscatory 
taxation.86 Harris  writes  that,  “constructive  expropriation”  occurs  when 
“events demonstrate that the owner was deprived of fundamental rights of 
ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely ephemeral.87 In 
Tippetts v. TAMS-ATTA88 the Tribunal insisted on an objective theory of 
State responsibility so that, it was not the intention of the government, or 
the form of the measures of control or interferences that mattered, but the 
effects of the measures on the owner and the reality of their impact that 
mattered.89 Property is defined as: “all movable and immovable property, 
whether  tangible  or  intangible,  including  industrial,  literary,  and  artistic 
property, as well as rights and interests in any property”.90 
In  Commercial Farmers Union v Minister of Lands, Agriculture  
and  Resettlement  v  Others91 the  applicant,  an  incorporated  voluntary 
84 23 International Legal Materials (1984), p.1090.
85 See Harris, D. J. (1998) Cases and Materials on International Law, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, p.555.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid. p.556.
88 6 Iran-USCTR (1985), p.219 at 225.
89 See also Explanatory note to the 1961 Harvard Draft Convention, Article 10 in 
American Journal of International Law, 55 (1961), p.558.
90 See Harris, D. J. (1998) Cases and Materials on International Law, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, p.557.
91 SC/132/2000
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association that  represents the interests of  commercial farmers operating 
within Zimbabwe sought an order declaring inter alia that the exercise of 
acquiring land by the Land Task Force was not proceeding in accordance 
with  the  Declaration  of  Rights  under  Chapter  3  of  the  Zimbabwe 
Constitution. Section 16, which is provides that: 
1) Subject  to section sixteen A, no property No property of any description or 
interest or right therein shall be compulsorily acquired except under the authority 
of a law that—
(a) requires— 
(i) in  the  case  of  land  or  any  interest  or  right 
therein,  that  the  acquisition  is  reasonably 
necessary  for  the  utilisation  of  that  or  any 
other land— 
A. for  settlement  for  agricultural  or  other 
purposes; or
B. for  purposes  of  land  reorganization, 
forestry,  environmental  conservation  or 
the utilisation of wild life or other natural 
resources; or 
C. for the relocation of persons dispossessed 
in  consequence  of  the utilisation of  land 
for a purpose referred to in subparagraph 
A or B;
or
(ii) in the case of any property, including land, or 
any interest or right therein, that the acquisition 
is  reasonably  necessary  in  the  interests  of 
defence,  public  safety,  public  order,  public 
morality,  public  health,  town  and  country 
planning or the utilisation of that or any other 
property for a purpose beneficial to the public 
generally or to any section of the public;
Further, Section 16A, which deals with “Agricultural Land Acquired for 
Resettlement” provides that:
1) In regard to the compulsory acquisition of agricultural land for the resettlement 
of people in accordance with a programme of land reform, the following factors 
shall be regarded as of ultimate and overriding importance— 
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               (a) under colonial domination the people of Zimbabwe were unjustifiably
               dispossessed of their land and other resources without compensation; 
   (b) the people consequently took up arms in order to regain their land 
and political
               sovereignty,  and this ultimately resulted in the Independence of 
Zimbabwe in
               1980; 
   (c) the people of Zimbabwe must be enabled to reassert their rights and
               regain ownership of their land; 
               and accordingly— 
                         (i)  the former colonial  power has an obligation to pay 
compensation
                         for agricultural land compulsorily acquired for resettlement, 
through
                         an adequate fund established for the purpose; and (ii) if the former
                         colonial power fails to pay compensation through such a fund, the
                         Government of Zimbabwe has no obligation to pay compensation 
for
                         agricultural land compulsorily acquired for resettlement. 
(2)  In  view  of  the  overriding  considerations  set  out  in  subsection  (1),  where 
agricultural  land  is  acquired  compulsorily  for  the  resettlement  of  people  in 
accordance with a programme of land reform, the following factors shall be taken 
into account in the assessment of any compensation that may be payable¾ 
(a) the history of the ownership, use and occupation of the land; 
(b) the price paid for the land when it was last acquired; 
(c) the cost or value of improvements on the land; 
(d) the current use to which the land and any improvements on it are 
being put; 
(e) any investment which the State or the acquiring authority may have 
made which improved or enhanced the value of the land and any 
improvements on it;
(f) the resources available to the acquiring authority in implementing 
the programme of land reform; 
(g) any  financial  constraints  that  necessitate  the  payment  of 
compensation in instalments over a period of time; and 
(h) any  other  relevant  factor  that  may  be  specified  in  an  Act  of 
Parliament.
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Sitting  in  its  capacity  as  the  Constitutional  Court  of  Zimbabwe,  the 
Supreme Court held that the compulsory acquisition of agricultural land for 
resettlement was a programme of land reform. Such a plan would have to 
be in conformity with the law.
Apart from those farms whose owners had agreed to the takeover of their 
properties, the settling of people on farms had been entirely haphazard 
and  unlawful:  a  network  of  organizations,  operating  with  complete 
disregard for the law, had been allowed to take over from the government. 
War veterans, villagers and unemployed townspeople had simply moved 
onto  farms,  encouraged,  supported,  transported  and  financed  by  party 
officials,  public  servants,  the Central  Intelligence Organization and the 
Army. Such settlement had not been done in terms of a programme of 
land reform or in terms of the Land Acquisition Act92
… as to the respondents’ contention that the matter was a political one 
and not a legal matter, that, while it was fundamentally true that the land 
issue was a political question and that the political method of resolving 
that  question  was  by  enacting  laws,  the  Government  had  enacted  and 
amended the Land Acquisition Act and then failed to obey its own law by 
flouting the procedures laid down in that Act. The Courts were doing no 
more than to insist that the State  comply with the law.93
The Court’s insistence on the rule of law is justifiable. The need to separate 
the functions of the legislator, judiciary, and the executive is recognized in 
the doctrine of  separation of powers.  Acknowledgment  justifications  for 
this doctrine are offered by Locke94  who writes that:
It may be too great a temptation to humane frailty, apt to grasp at power, 
for the same persons who have the power of making law, to have also in 
their  hands  the  power  to  execute  them,  whereby  they  may  exempt 
themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law both in 
its making and execution, to their own private advantage. 
Therefore,  application  of  the  doctrine  is  an  attempt  at  institutionalizing 
conscience  in  order  to  ensure  accountability  that  promotes  democratic 
governance.  Montesquieu95 who  argues  that  if  the  judiciary  is  not 
92 At 940B/C-D.
93 At 940I-941A.
94 Locke, J. (1980) The Second Treatise of Civil Government, Hackett Publishing, 
Indianapolis Ch XII, Para 143
95 Montesquieu, “De l’Espirit des Lois” Book XI, Chapter 6 cited in Bradley, A.W. 
& Ewing, K.D. (12th edn 1997) Constitutional and Administrative Law, Longman, 
London, p.92.
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independent  of  the  legislature  and  the  executive,  the  law  cannot  be 
employed  as  a  means  of  ensuring  liberty  advances  human  rights 
justifications for the doctrine.  The law could not in those circumstances 
empower the citizen to challenge the lawfulness of legislative or executive 
orders that impede his rights.  He writes that:
 When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, 
or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty … Again, there 
is no liberty, if the judicial power be not separated from the legislative and 
executive.  Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the 
subject would be exposed to the arbitrary control; for the judge would 
then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive however, the judge 
might behave with violence and oppression.  There would be an end to 
everything were the same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or 
of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of 
executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals. 
Without  a  separation  of  powers,  collusion  of  functions  with  respect  to 
clearly delineated purposes of the organs of government is possible.  That 
possibility  threatens  wherever  it  exists  to  undermine  objectivity  in  the 
conduct of government.   
Application  of  the  doctrine  is  a  matter  of  course  in  democratic 
States,  suggesting  firm  acceptance  of  the  virtues  of  the  doctrine.  The 
United Kingdom Bill of Rights (1869) and the Act of Settlement (1700) are 
credited with establishing the doctrine in the modern British Constitution.96 
The United States Constitution of 1787 carefully delineates the functions of 
the executive, judiciary and legislature, providing for a system of checks 
and balances to that facilitates a measure of accountability. South Africa’s 
constitution of 1996 provides for a Constitutional Court that acts as final 
guarantor  of  protection  of  individuals  from  State  power.  Japan’s 
Constitution of 1946 shows similar adherence to the doctrine.  However, in 
practice States have struggled to maintain a clear separation between the 
functions of these organs.  The office of the Lord Chancellor has caused 
difficulty in the application of the doctrine for the United Kingdom. The 
incumbent  is  part  of  the  legislature,  executive  and  judiciary.  The  Lord 
Chancellor sits as a member of the judiciary in the House of Lords but sits 
also with the Prime Minister as a full member of his cabinet.  Arguing for 
the abolition of the office of Lord Chancellor, Woodhouse97 writes that it 
96 See McEldowney, J.F. (2nd edn 1998) Public Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
p.8.
97 Woodhouse, D. (1997) In Pursuit of Good Administration – Ministers, Civil  
Servants and Judges, Clarendon Press, Oxford p.120
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taints the British Constitution by perpetuating a culture of “managerialism 
and market politics.” The dual roles of the Lord Chancellor as Law Lord 
and  Cabinet  Officer  results  in  a  strong possibility  that  justice  could  be 
undermined by pursuit of political ends. 
However, what is difficult to justify in Commercial Farmers Union 
v Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Resettlement v Others98 is the Court’s 
complete  blindness  to  the  realities  of  social  evolution.  Where  legal 
procedures preferred by the State are overtaken by popular revolt of the 
people, the  grundnorm,  or an aspect of it, is replaced not in the orderly 
manner  previously  contemplated  by  the  collapsing  order,  but  by  force. 
Except that there has not been such a fundamental change in Zimbabwe. 
Without such a change the Courts could and should continue to hold the 
Government to account particularly because the Government has the power 
to  legislate  and  to  effect  its  own  laws  to  achieve  its  political  ends. 
Assuming  that  the  contemplated  political  ends  are  justifiable,  the 
government’s ineptitude becomes the problem. The government becomes 
the  legitimate  target  of  the  people’s  frustration  and  not  officers  of  the 
Courts.  Had  the  government  managed  efficiently  to  create  the  laws  it 
needed  for  land  redistribution,  perhaps  the  war  veterans,  villagers  and 
jobless  townspersons  would  not  have  resorted  to  violent,  self-help 
measures. But the language of the Courts in these cases surprisingly shows 
the judges and justices wanting to convince us that their task is merely to 
apply the law regardless the reality of the context in which they operate. 
This casts suspicion on the objectivity of the Court because judges are not 
mere automatons, blindly pushing the buttons of the law. On the contrary 
they can and perhaps should seek to realise the objective and purpose of 
particular national laws rather than seek to demonstrate that Parliament or 
Government has been inept when the laws in question were debated in their 
full glare. In  Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart and related appeals,99 the 
House of Lords considered at length whether judges may use Parliamentary 
Hansard as an aid to Parliamentary construction, contrary to the general 
rule  which  forbade  reference  to  such  material  in  construing  statutory 
provisions. The Court stated that  “Statute law consisted of the words that 
Parliament had enacted. It was for the Courts to construe those words and it 
was  the  Court’s  duty  in  so  doing  to  give  effect  to  the  intention  of 
Parliament in using those words”. Therefore the proper allocation of work 
is  that  Parliament legislates and the  courts  construe  the  meaning of  the 
words finally enacted. The Court held that:
98 SC/132/2000
99 [1993] AC593.
59
Eternal Land Rights? Interaction of divergent Land Rights in the SADC
In many cases references to Parliamentary materials would not throw any 
light  on the  matter.  But  in  a  few cases  it  might  emerge that  the very 
question was considered by Parliament in passing the legislation. In such 
cases the Courts should not blind themselves by strictly adhering to the 
rule  excluding  references  to  Parliamentary  material  as  a  guide  to  the 
construction  of  the  words  used  in  the  Statute.  Thus,  subject  to  any 
question  of  Parliamentary  privilege,  the  exclusionary  rule  would  be 
relaxed so as  to  permit  reference  to  parliamentary materials  where  (a) 
legislation was ambiguous or obscure, or led to absurdity; (b) the material 
relied  on  consisted  of  one  or  more  statements  by  a  Minister  or  other 
promoter of the Bill together if necessary with such other parliamentary 
material as was necessary to understand such statements and their effects; 
and (c) the statements relied on were clear.
Thus judges are more than mere automatons pushing the buttons of the law. 
They are co-creators of the law. Cooray100 writes that interpretation of the 
law provides some basis for modification and judges in one of three ways 
can  effect  fundamental  change  in  the  law.  First,  judges  can  express 
disagreement with pre-existing law for whatever reasons, and substitute a 
new rule  or  a  new set  of  rules,  in  effect  over  ruling  the  cases,  which 
declared  the  pre-existing  law.  Second,  judges  can  ignore  precedent  and 
prior  decisions and make a statement of  new law. Third,  “judges could 
pretend  that  they  were  following  existing  law and  manipulate  previous 
decisions  to  obtain  the  desired  results.  Courts  in  Australia,  and  other 
common law countries have done this for generations”.101 Thus, decisions 
like  Commercial  Farmers  Union  v  Minister  of  Lands,  Agriculture  and 
Resettlement  v  Others where  the  judges  appear  to  fold  their  hands  in 
matters of constitutional importance and mock the Government instead of 
giving effect to its intentions cast doubt on the willingness of the judiciary 
concerned to give effect to Governmental intentions, notwithstanding the 
desired practice of separating judicial powers of government, namely the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary.
The forcible expropriation of land adopted by President Mugabe is 
contrary to the South African model, which privileges the rule of law in the 
resolution of a similar problem. In recognition of the past and continuing 
social injustice of inequitable distribution of land according to race, the first 
majority  rule  government  of  South  Africa  established  in  1996  a  Land 
Claims  Court,  which  hears  disputes  arising  from  laws  which  underpin 
South Africa’s  land reform initiative.  These are  the Restitution of Land 
100 Cooray, M. “Mabo Amends State Constitutions”, at 
http://www.ourcivilisation.com/cooray/mabo/indexa.htm    (visited 04/05/03)
101 Ibid.
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Rights Act 22 of 1994, the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 
and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. The Land Claims 
Court is an independent court. It enjoys the same status as the High Court 
of  South  Africa.  Appeals  lie  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal  and  in 
appropriate  cases,  to  the  Constitutional  Court.  South  Africa’s  interim 
Constitution (1993) provided for the right to claim restitution against the 
State on persons that could prove that they had been dispossessed of their 
land under racist legislation. It mandated the creation of a Commission on 
the Restitution of Land Rights and a Land Claims Court to give effect to 
this process. In 1994 the Restitution of Land Rights Act was passed. The 
Act provided for a constitutional framework of the said constitutional right. 
That  framework  evidences  earlier  procedures  of  the  European  Court  of 
Human Rights,  which had a Commission,  which filtered frivolous cases 
from  deserving  ones.  Current  procedure  is  that  individuals  (or  their 
descendants)  and communities  who were  dispossessed of  their  rights  in 
land in terms of racially discriminatory laws or practices have the right to 
claim restitution against the State. All claims must first be submitted to the 
Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights, whose role is to investigate 
the merits of claims and attempt to settle them through mediation. Where a 
claim  cannot  be  settled  through  mediation,  the  Commission  prepares  a 
comprehensive report, and refers the claim to the Land Claims Court for 
final  determination.  Successful  settlements  must  also  be  referred  to  the 
Court in order for the Court to scrutinise them and give them the status of 
court orders. In this way, the Land Claims Court validates all restitution 
claims.  The task of  the Land Claims Court  is  to  decide the  nature  and 
appropriateness  of  restitution  in  each  case.  In  some  cases,  restitution 
involves the return of the original piece of land that was taken – restoration. 
If  this  requires  expropriation  then  the  current  owner  is  entitled  to  fair 
compensation. In some cases, restitution involves resettling the claimant on 
alternative  state  owned  land  or  monetary  compensation.  Where 
compensation is due, either to a claimant or to a current owner who is being 
expropriated, the Court must decide on the amount of compensation. 
The  Restitution  of  Land  Rights  Act  was  amended by  the  Land 
Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act (1997), which incorporated 
a new Chapter. Chapter IIIA allows claimants to approach the Land Claims 
Court directly without first going to the Commission. However, this option 
requires claimants themselves to undertake all the necessary investigative 
and preparatory work before submitting the claim to the Court. To date, the 
Court has had a very busy docket. This reflects both the magnitude of the 
problem of inequitable access and distribution of land under apartheid and 
confidence of those most dependent on its work. 
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Ndebele-Ndzundza Community  concerning the farm Kafferskraal  
No 181JS102  raised several questions. The first was whether there existed a 
community in accordance with the Act in relation to the said property after 
19 June 1913, and if there existed a community, what its identity was. The 
second related to the rights the community had held in respect of the farm. 
The fourth was whether such a community had lost any rights it might have 
had in relation to the said property as a result of past racially discriminatory 
laws or practices. The fifth was whether the claim for restitution had been 
lodged in compliance with the Act. The sixth was whether the claim was 
not excluded in terms of section 2(2) of the Act. The Court found that:
there was a community as contemplated in the Act on the farm after 19 
June  1913,  and  that  its  identity  was  that  of  the  Ndebele-Ndzundza 
community. The community had had rights of beneficial occupation for 
not less than ten years prior to dispossession. The Court found that the 
community  had  been  dispossessed  of  these  rights  as  a  result  of  past 
discriminatory laws and practices, and that the claim for restitution had 
been lodged in compliance with the Act. The Court found that, since the 
resettlement of the community in about 1939 was seen as a temporary 
measure by the government, the land the community was moved to was 
not compensation as contemplated in section 2(2) of the Act. In addition, 
the Court found that a relocation in furtherance of homeland policy could 
not  be  accepted  as  compensation  in  terms  of  the  Act,  since  such  a 
relocation was an act of the type that the Act and the Constitution were 
intended to undo.103
The effect of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act (1996) is to shield 
labour tenants from arbitrary eviction. Nonetheless, they may be evicted in 
accordance with certain procedures. They cannot be dismissed without a 
court order issued by the Land Claims Court. Under the Act, labour tenants 
may apply for ownership of that portion of the farm over which they have 
historically had use rights. The function of the Land Claims Court is to 
decide whether such ownership rights should indeed be granted, or whether 
the granting of lesser rights or compensation would be more appropriate. 
Where ownership is granted to labour tenants, farm owners are entitled to 
fair compensation. 
Combrinck  v  Nhlapo is  a  case  that  was  transferred  from  the 
Magistrates Court Carolina pursuant to section 13(1A) of the Land Reform 
102 LCC3/00, Judgment of 23 December 2002, at 
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/lcc/summary.php?case_id=2543 (visited 
02/05/03)
103 ibid.
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(Labour Tenants) Act (1996) to the Land Claims Court when the defendant 
raised the defence that he was an associate of a labour tenant in terms of the 
Labour Tenants Act. In the alternate, the defendant claimed that the status 
of an occupier as provided for under the Extension of Security of Tenure 
Act (1997). The defendant was not himself a labour tenant. The Court ruled 
that because the defendant had not been nominated yet by the labour tenant 
as his successor,  he could not be regarded as an associate of the labour 
tenant. Nonetheless, the Court held that he could not be evicted because he 
was an occupier whose right of residence had not been terminated. 
The  Extension  of  Security  of  Tenure  Act  (1997)  protects  rural 
occupiers  of  land,  other  than  labour  tenants,  against  arbitrary  eviction 
except  in  certain  circumstances.  Under  the  Act  parties  can  seize  the 
Magistrate’s Court,  High Court  or  the Land Claims Court.  Of the three 
courts,  the  Land Claims Court  is  the  final  arbiter.  The  Act  subjects  all 
eviction orders granted by Magistrates’ Courts to automatic reviewof the 
Land Claims  Court  for  a  period  of  two years.  Automatic  review under 
s19(3) of the Act has exercised the Court’s docket considerably.104 The Act 
constrains the High Court from actual interpretation of the Act, requiring it 
in all cases to halt proceedings and refer them to the Land Claims Court. It 
does  not  however,  take away the  right  to  appeal  decisions  of  the  Land 
Claims Court to the Supreme Court of Appeal, and in appropriate cases, to 
the Constitutional Court. 
In Nhlabathi and others v Fick (2003)105 The petitioners applied for 
an  order  in  terms  of  section  6(2)(dA)  of  the  Extension  of  Security  of 
Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA) allowing for the burial of a family member 
on a farm owned by the respondents. The respondents’ principal argument 
was that the applicants were not occupiers as defined in ESTA, and that 
section  6(2)(dA)  was  not  constitutionally  valid  because  it  provided  for 
burial  rights.  This  brought  it  into  the  realm  of  exclusive  provincial 
legislative competence. Secondly, that section infringed the constitutional 
protection of property. 
The Court ruled that the constitutional right to property is subject 
to  limitations  that  are  “…  reasonable  and  justifiable  in  an  open  and 
democratic  society  based  on  human  dignity,  equality  and  freedom”.106 
104 For example Biffen v Sithole and another, LCC07R/02, judgment of 29 January 
2003; Hanekom v Hendriks en andere, LCC13R/03, Judgment of 24 February 
2003; Van Den Berg v Skosana LCC10R/03 Judgment of 18 February 2003 at 
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/lcc/cases.php?browse_judgmentyear=2003&subm
it_quickbrowse=Browse (visited 02/05/03)
105 Land Claims Court - LCC42/02, Judgment of 8 April 2003
106 Ibid. at http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/lcc/summary.php?case_id=12140 
(visited 02/05/03)
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Article 6(2)(dA) contained sufficient safeguards, including the requirement 
that the right to bury a family member should be balanced with the right of 
the owner,  and that  a  burial  may only take place if  there is  already an 
established practice of burials on that land. The Court did not rule out the 
possibility that the owner could legitimately refuse burial on his land of 
deceased occupiers because in all cases, the Court must balance the rights 
of the owner against those of the occupier.107 It held that in this case there 
was no factor that would tip the balance in favour of the owner because the 
deceased  had  been resident  on  the  farm at  the  time of  his  death.  “The 
existence of two other family graves on the farm led to the conclusion that 
there  was  an  established  practice  of  permitting  burials  on  the  farm.”108 
Therefore, the requirements of section 6(2)(dA) of ESTA were fulfilled. 
The Court granted an order that the first applicant was entitled to bury the 
body of his late father on the farm. The judgment makes good law in that 
for most far workers in the SADC, their personal landlessness forced them 
to work on the farms. Subsequently, the farms became their places of work, 
but also the only places they could call home. But the dispute demonstrates 
also the need for judicial mechanisms and procedures for resolving such 
issues. Even more, it reveals the extent to which respect for the dignity of 
persons as fellow human beings has sunk in some places. It may be alright 
to labour at a farm, in the rain, dust, cold and wind for all your life but once 
you drop dead, you are not good enough even to be stored in the bowels of 
mother earth at the same place that you worked. 
The practice of establishing or strengthening work of land claims 
courts is growing. The Maori Land Court (Te Kooti Whenua Maori) is the 
New Zealand court that hears matters relating to Maori land. The Court is 
the only Maori court. Its operational procedures are contained in section 
2(2)  of  Te  Ture  Whenua  Maori  Act  1993.  On  15  December  1989  the 
Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii promulgated rules of the Land Court. 
The Scottish Land Court Act 1993 (c. 45) consolidates certain enactments 
relating to the constitution and proceedings of the Scottish Land Court and 
repeals provisions of the Crofters Holdings (Scotland) Act 1886 relating to 
the Scottish Land Court.
  The work of the Land Court of South Africa is commendable. It 
will placate the heat from South Africa’s land issue only to the extent that 
the landless peasants that need land actually rely on it to legitimise their 
claims. But  to the extent  that  locus standi before the Court  depends on 
demonstration  of  existence  of  a  previously  held  title  to  land  that  was 
107 The Court granted orders of eviction sought by the owner in Gay NO v Sibiya 
and others, LCC120/00, Judgment of 4 April 2002. ibid.
108 Ibid.
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expropriated  through  racially  motivated  laws  under  apartheid,  there  are 
many that will not be able to bring claims  qua individuals because may 
never have had the opportunity to hold land. The practice of expropriating 
land from natives spanned more than a century in South Africa. In that 
period many never even got their foot onto the property ladder either as 
communities or individuals. Further, apartheid was skilful at scattering and 
dividing black communities, so that where a claim of restitution could be 
brought only as a community, “what you get is competing claims for the 
same piece of  land from groups”109 In such cases the competing claims 
must be resolved among the groups themselves before the merits of a claim 
can  be  considered  by  the  Court.  Therefore,  the  legislature  might  have 
created too finely meshed a filter mechanism by requiring demonstration of 
previous ownership of land for a claim to be brought to the Land Court. 
This may alienate many landless people who through no fault of their own 
are not in position to demonstrate that, even though their situation shows 
that they need land to work for a living.  One interpretation may be that the 
Court is not a forum for land distribution. The Court serves only to restore 
and enforce certain rights in land. If that is correct, then South Africa may 
still  need  to  develop  mechanisms  for  land  redistribution.   While  some 
people will be able to demonstrate group rights over particular lands, many 
will  not  because of  fragmentation of communities  that  has  happened in 
South Africa,  aided by the  efficient  anti  black family laws of apartheid 
South  Africa.  These  are  satirised  in  Alan  Paton’s  “Cry  the  Beloved 
Country.”  Moreover,  not  every  SADC  State  enjoys  South  Africa’s 
privileged position of being able either to purchase land or to compensate 
successful claimants under the Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994). But 
land  restoration  that  achieves  nothing  more  than  recreation  of  early 
twentieth  century  communal  existence  without  conferring  opportunities 
that empower the peasants to exploit that land in a manner that facilitates 
realisation of SADC economic aspirations may not suffice. The quality of 
the  title  to  land  enjoyed  just  before  restoration  must  be  maintained  by 
creation of individual titles that beneficiaries can use in the market place to 
secure developmental loans with banks, lease for a period for a fee or even 
sell if they wish. These are the qualities that make land more than just a 
dwelling place.
Non-Governmental  organizations  interested  in  land  rights  of  the 
landless are commonplace in South Africa. They are the mouthpieces of 
many whose situations do not quite fit into the scheme contemplated under 
the Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994). The Land Access Movement of 
South  Africa  (LAMOSA)  -  a  community-based  movement  of  rural 
109 Discussion with the Judge President of South Africa’s Land Court, 05/05/03.
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communities from Gauteng, North-West, Mpumalanga, and Limpopo puts 
South Africa’s landless rural people at nineteen million. Most of these may 
not fit into the Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994) particularly because 
they  may  not  have  locus  standi  before  the  Land  Court.  In  Baphiring 
Community v Uys and others (2002)110 the Land Court considered whether 
a plaintiff ( the  Baphiring   Community) who constituted only part of the 
full community (the full community being the Baphiring tribe), had locus  
standi under the Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994). The plaintiff did 
not show that the majority of the tribe members supported the claim. The 
Court held that the Baphiring Community, as a part of the Baphiring tribe, 
was entitled to claim restitution of a right in land dispossessed from the full 
community. Nonetheless, the Baphiring Community did not have the right 
to act on behalf of the Baphiring tribe because it was not representive of the 
majority  of  the  tribe  members.  This  underlines  the  community  based 
approach to standing to petition the Court  for  restoration as opposed to 
individual  claims.  The  situation  is  exacerbated  that  even  where  a 
community is established, it has to be the total community and not only part 
of it, an honorous requirement in modern day South Africa following the 
thorough scattering of people by the employment  and social regimes of 
apartheid.  However,  in  Mahlangu  v  The  Minister  of  Land  Affairs  and 
others (2003111) the Land Court stated that the right to claim restitution of a 
right in land is protected in the Bill of Rights. Therefore, such a right must 
be interpreted generously. Clearly the question of standing before the Land 
Court may shut out many landless peasants from applying for restitution. It 
makes  clear  that  the  Land  Court  is  perhaps  not  about  resettlement  in 
general,  but  restoration  of  particular  land  rights.  If  that  is  correct,  then 
South  Africa  still  has  to  address  that  other  problem:  resettlement  of 
millions  of  landless  native  persons.  On  21  March  2003  LAMOSA 
boycotted Human Rights Day celebrations to protest what it called: 
..day for the privileged few of our country to celebrate the rights which 
are not enjoyed by the majority of our people, while millions continue to 
suffer from landlessness, poverty and human rights abuses. Almost nine 
years have now passed since the end of apartheid, and less than 2% of the 
country's  land  has  been  restored  or  redistributed  from white  to  black, 
leaving 60,000 white farmers still controlling about 85% of our country, 
while the black majority is forced to eke out a living on the remaining 
110 LCC64/98, Judgment of 29 January 2002, at 
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/lcc/cases.php?browse_judgmentyear=2002&subm
it_quickbrowse=Browse
111 LCC116/99, judgment of 6 February 2003, at 
http://www.concourt.gov.za:9999/law/lcc.aln (visited 03/05/03)
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15% of land or toil under slave-like working conditions on the farms that 
belong  to  their  ancestors,  but  which  are  still  the  "property"  of  white 
farmers.112
2.6. Legitimacy of Law’s intervention in re-ordering of titles to land 
Given  that  international  law  actually  legitimated  colonization  and  that 
colonial governments relied on law to impose their political agendas on an 
unwilling and uncooperative native population, it is not a misnomer to ask 
the question whether the law could even be regarded as a relevant candidate 
to the resolution of the problem. The universal culture of Human Rights 
that  now  casts  law  as  the  dominant  or  even  probable  candidate  for 
resolution of the land issue and other continuing social injustices whose 
roots are firmly anchored in the injustices of colonial occupation of SADC 
States is arguably inapplicable for three reasons. First, it was established 
post facto the issue in question. The element of time is a worry for lawyers 
in relation to the temporal sphere of validity of the legal norm.113 To apply 
it might violate the legal principle of non-retroactivity. This problem has 
plagued debate bout the legality of the Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals. 
The need to avoid similar criticism appeared to be uppermost in the United 
Nations  when  it  was  next  called  upon  to  respond  to  crimes  against 
humanity,  war crimes and other international  offences  committed in  the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively. Secondly,  even if that  law 
now applied to the present situation rather than to its history, its application 
would allow for enormous margins of appreciation that might even be said 
to be irreconcilable. For instance, it could not uphold settler commercial 
farming titles and insist on the compensation of white farmers at the point 
that the new government assumed authority to resettle landless peasants, 
without also justifying titles that were illegal under Mabo. Mabo held that 
native  claims  to  title  to  land  subsisted,  endured  and  persisted  beyond 
colonization,  making  any  other  title  superimposed  over  them  illegal. 
Thirdly, the legitimacy of International Human Rights law might be tainted 
forever  in  the  perception of  blacks  for  whom international  law initially 
legitimated slavery, colonization and discrimination. It  would undermine 
International Law’s continuing process of redemption in the eyes of those 
for  whom  abolition  first  of  slavery,  and  later  of  colonial  and  racist 
112 See “Human Rights Day celebrations a mirage for the landless”,  at 
http://www.nlc.co.za/pubs2003/press-mar-18-hr-day.htm (visited 03/05/03)
113 See Tur, R.H.S. (2002) “Time and Law”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
Vol.22 No.3 p.463; Kelsen, H. (1945) General Theory of Law and State, Russel 
and Russel, New York, p.45.
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domination  were  the  initial  steps.  A  disparity  in  the  allocation  of 
international energy and resources between similar  African and Western 
issues is often used as a measure of international law’s attitude towards 
Africa. For instance, some argue that but for the creation in 1993 of the 
International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the  former  Yugoslavia  (ICTY),  the 
Security Council might never have established the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). It is widely acknowledged that the Rwanda 
Genocide that led to the creation of the ICTR is the most efficient human 
catastrophe  experienced  since  the  Second  World  War.  Therefore,  it 
probably was more grotesque than others that occurred around that time. 
Yet financial and other resources allocated to the tribunals suggests that 
international law has not quite shaken away its earlier Western centricism. 
While this criticism appears to be justified, it disregards the fact that no 
legal system is perfect, and that imperfections do not mean that we should 
stop working to improve our institutions. On the contrary, we should persist 
in the effort to create substantive rules and procedures necessary to make 
those institutions more efficient,  legitimate and fairer.  History serves us 
best when we discover from it and apply today what we should have in the 
past, however long ago that may have been. To persist as if legal science 
had not profited from two hundred years of practice is akin to dying today 
of  an  ailment  that  penicillin  would  cure  in  a  day  or  two.  International 
Human  Rights  law  which  started  to  gain  momentum  after  the  Second 
World War is relevant to our quest for strategies for resolving problems 
anchored in a time well before the firmament of the Universal Culture of 
Human Rights began to take effect.
2.7. Native Claim to Land: Is it Eternal?
It is estimated that indigenous peoples in the world today number between 
250 and 300 million, or upwards to 600 million if the distinct peoples of 
Africa  are  included,  making  up  between  5%  and  10%  of  the  world’s 
population.114 In China and India, indigenous peoples make up 7% of the 
population, that is, 80 and 65 million respectively. In Latin America, the 
largest numbers are found in Peru 8.6 million and Mexico 8 million. In 
Africa they number over 25 million, in North America 2.5 million,  and 
over 160,000 members of the Inuit and Saami groups populate the Arctic 
and northern Europe. The survival of these groups is threatened in several 
114 Washington, J.L. (1998) “United Nations Human Rights Apparatus for the 
Protection of Indigenous Peoples”, The Mediterranean Journal of Human Rights, 
vol.2 No.2
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parts of the world sometimes by natural conditions, sometimes by health 
conditions  which  continue  to  be  the  most  appalling  in  the  world,  and 
sometimes  by  the  pressure  of  surrounding  populations  and  government 
institutions. As an example, nearly 125,000 Tuareg nomads in the Sahara 
starved  to  death  during  the  droughts  of  the  1970s.115 Increasingly,  the 
combination of Government and multinational corporations’ interest in the 
mineral resources of the Kalahari Desert of Botswana is threatening the 
Bushmen’s  way of  life  with  efforts  being  made  forcibly  to  make  them 
urban dwellers. In the effort to draw attention to cultural and proprietary 
injustices, there is a tendency to categorise and statisticise the either or, or 
both the victim(s) and the aggressor(s) as I have just done with indigenous 
people. Yet, if ever we needed reminding of the difficulty, and sometimes 
futility  of  categorisation,  we  need  not  look  further  than  the  divided 
conceptual framework of the human rights regime. Attempts to cast rights 
as civil and political on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural on 
the other have significantly weakened the potential of the movement for 
now, to promote, protect and ensure the sanctity of the inherent dignity of 
man  precisely  because  any  real  enjoyment  of  civil  and  political  rights 
impliedly presumes or assumes fulfilment of certain economic and social 
and cultural rights. Tell a homeless man freezing on a New York sub-way 
that he has the right to freedom of speech (Article 19 ICCPR 1966); or a 
man  starving  to  death  under  a  savannah  tree  that  he  has  the  right  to 
participate in the governing of his country by participating in periodic free 
and fair elections (Article 25 ICCPR 1966). Determination of “a people” 
viz  the right  to  self-determination;116 and “indigenous” in  the  context  of 
exploitation  of  natural  resources117 demonstrate  that  we  indulge  in  the 
exercise of  categorisation at  the risk of  unhelpful  reductionism. Yet  we 
cannot do without it because particularly when we speak of rights, we raise 
inevitably the question of limits because first, resources are not unlimited, 
and  second,  some  rights  target  specific  needs  of  particular  sections  of 
communities. Since the second half of the last century, international law 
began to acknowledge that indigenous peoples have claim rights under the 
115 See “A Commitment to Plularism: Indigenous Peoples”, at 
http://kvc.minbuza.nl/uk/archive/report/chapter2_6.html (visited 18 April 2003)
116 Acknowledging this difficulty, but insisting that the principle appears to have a 
core of reasonable certainty, see Brownlie, I. (1988) “The Rights of Peoples in 
Modern Interrnational Law”, in Crawford, J.  (ed) The Rights of Peoples, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.1 at 5.
117 Arguing that most Africans do not fit into the category of indigenous people, see 
Date-Bah, S.K. (1998) “Rights of Indigenous People in Relation to Natural 
Resources Development: An African’s Perspective”, Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resources Law, vol.16 No.4 pp.389 – 412.
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international  legal  system,  thus  recognising  groups  as  subjects  of 
international law both as peoples and as an indigenous entity. This two-
pronged evolution of local people’s rights hastened juridical recognition of 
their rights. Convention No.107 of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other 
Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations (1957) appears to have set off juridical 
normative recognition of  claim rights  of  indigenous people.  Revision in 
1989 of Convention No. 107 with Convention No. 169  (1989) showed the 
growing importance of the subject. Between the adoption of Convention 
No.  107  and  Convention  No.  169  Commissions,  Sub Commissions  and 
Working Groups were established that researched and presented reports on 
indigenous people’s status and rights.118 Moreover, the ICCPR had declared 
in  Article  27  group  rights  of  persons  belonging  to  ethnic,  religious  or 
linguistic  minorities.  In  1992,  two  developments  cemented  juridical 
recognition of  indigenous peoples’  rights.  One was establishment at  the 
Earth Summit in Rio of Agenda 21 which was adopted as a strategy for the 
implementation of principles and policies agreed upon by the negotiating 
conference. Agenda 21 specifically required that the lands of indigenous 
peoples and their communities should be protected from activities that are 
environmentally  unsound  or  that  the  indigenous  people  consider  to  be 
socially and culturally inappropriate. The other, was adoption by the UN 
General Assembly of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities which in Article 1 
enjoins States to:
 
1) protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious 
and  linguistic  identity  of   minorities  within  their  respective 
territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that 
identity, and
2) adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those 
measures.
However, juridically, indigenous and minority groups are not necessarily 
one and the same thing. Washington119 writes that protection of indigenous 
118 For a discussion of some of these see Nettheim, G. (1988) “Peoples’ and 
Populations – Indigenous Peoples and the Rights of Peoples” in Crawford, J. (ed) 
The Rights of Peoples, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp.107- 26; Brownlie, I. (1988) 
“The Rights of Peoples in Modern Interrnational Law”, in Crawford, J.  (ed) The 
Rights of Peoples, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.1 at 4.
119 Washington, J.L. (1998) “United Nations Human Rights Apparatus for the 
Protection of Indigenous Peoples”, The Mediterranean Journal of Human Rights, 
vol.2 No.2
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peoples  in  international  law  is  relatively  recent  while  attempts  at 
safeguarding the rights of minority populations date back to the predecessor 
of the UN – the League of Nations. The working definition adopted by the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Minorities suggests that a minority is “a group 
numerically smaller than the rest of the population of the State to which it 
belongs  and  possessing  cultural,  physical  or  historical  characteristics,  a 
religion or a language different from those of the rest of the population”.120 
Similarities are few between the two groups. The most common one is that 
both exist as a numerical minority on the territories that they are located. 
Their aspirations could not be more dissimilar. Whereas minorities aspire 
to either “assimilate into the dominant population with adequate safeguards 
to protect their unique characteristics and mores, or to gain equal standing 
within a nation-State structure, if not a State”,121 indigenous people are keen 
“to maintain, preserve or regain their separate and distinct attributes and 
existence in mutually exclusive communities. [They] … seldom consider 
themselves as voluntarily being members of any State and generally wish 
to  continue  their  own  indigenous  structures  rather  than  aspire  to 
Statehood”.122 Unlike  minorities,  indigenous  people  have  inhabited  their 
land  from  time  immemorial.  International  law  recognises  the  right  of 
indigenous populations to pursue the right to self-determination while the 
same cannot be said of minorities123 who are not necessarily indigenous. It 
is clear from the discussion so far that peasants of the SADC that are said 
to be the subject of land reform policy in the SADC are neither a minority 
in  the  juridical  sense  nor  indigenous  people.  For  the  sake  of  clarity, 
discussion of their case should desist from labelling them as such. 
But the juridical conception that has emerged of indigenous people has “… 
much to do with the West’s perception of non-Western peoples and the 
reaction of those non-Western peoples,  particularly in States where they 
constitute  a  minority”.124 This  has  skewed  the  juridical  conception  of 
indigenous peoples to exclude from them potential harvests of belonging to 
the category of indigenous population, the peasants of the SADC because 
they are neither a minority nor an indigenous population in the juridical 
sense. 
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
124 Date-Bah, S.K. (1998) “Rights of Indigenous People in Relation to Natural 
Resources Development: An African’s Perspective”, Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resources Law, vol.16 No.4 pp.389 at 390.
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Today, the term indigenous refers broadly to living descendants of pre-
invasion  inhabitants  of  lands  now  dominated  by  others.  Indigenous 
peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive groups that find 
themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and 
conquest. The diverse surviving Indian communities and nations of the 
Western Hemisphere, the Inuit and Aleut of the Arctic, the Aborigines of 
Australia, the Maori of New Zealand, the tribal peoples of Asia, and such 
other groups among those generally regarded as indigenous.125
But why? There are probably several reasons for this but two are to my 
mind salient ones. Firstly, while the post-colonial States of the SADC that 
have emerged from the collapse of the European empires may have within 
their jurisdiction indigenous peoples, it is perhaps correct to say that only a 
few of these people continue to identify themselves as indigenous peoples 
in the sense taken by human rights discourse. The majority do not perceive 
themselves as such nor do they expect anyone else to regard themselves as 
such. To borrow from Date-Bah,126 they have mainstreamed themselves in 
the political and economic life of their post-colonial State to the extent that 
the  core  essentials  of  the  juridical  definition  of  indigenous  peoples  no 
longer apply to them. A 1981 UN commissioned Study on the Problem of 
Discrimination  against  Indigenous  Populations127 and  led  by  Special 
Rapporteur José R. Martínez Cobo defined indigenous people as:
Those which, having a historical  continuity with pre-invasion and pre-
colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves 
distinct  from  other  sectors  of  the  societies  now  prevailing  in  those 
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of 
society and are determined to preserve,  develop and transmit  to future 
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis 
of  their  continued  existence  with  their  own  cultural  patterns,  social 
institutions and legal systems.
This understanding of “indigenous people” suggests that landless peasants’ 
claim of  an equal  share  of  the  land held by commercial  farmers in  the 
SADC  should  not  be  posited  as  indigenous  claims  because  the  core 
elements of this definition clearly do not fit with the SADC situation. They 
include:
125 Ibid. at 391.
126 Ibid. at390.
127 The first report was submitted in 1981 (EC/CN.4/Sub.2/476). The study was 
completed in l986 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 and Add.1-4). 
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1) Longstanding  ties  to  a  particular  land  area  by  a  group  that  shares  a 
conscious  sense  of  its  distinctness  from  the  surrounding  majority 
population.
2) A shared culture, language, ethnicity and social patterns that the group 
desires to identify themselves by, and pass on to future generations as a 
mark of distinction from the surrounding majority.
3) A context of numerical minority of the claimant group.
The  SADC land  issue  is  characterised  by  organised  people  of  varying 
backgrounds and aspirations that are incensed by the injustice of unequal 
access to land and the widespread poverty that that has resulted in. Article 1 
of the ILO Convention No. 169 (1989) defines indigenous peoples as:
a) tribal  peoples  in  independent  countries  whose  social,  cultural  and 
economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national 
community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own 
customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations;
b) peoples  in  independent  countries  who  are  regarded  as  indigenous  (by 
whom?) on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited 
the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the 
time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of the present State 
boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of 
their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.
In its guide to the interpretation of this Convention, the ILO is absolutely 
clear  that  references  in  the  Convention to indigenous and tribal  peoples 
refer “… to those who, while retaining totally or partially their traditional 
languages,  institutions,  and  lifestyles  which  distinguish  them  from  the 
dominant society, occupied a particular area before other population groups 
arrived”128 and  not  to  people  that  have  integrated  themselves  into  the 
mainstream  roles  of  their  national  life.  Nonetheless,  if  we  turn  to  the 
purpose for which the notion of indigenous peoples or even that of minority 
groups it would be odd if international law sought to guarantee the land 
rights of indigenous groups and minority groups but not those of majority 
native  populations  that  were  dispossessed  after  colonial  occupation  of 
Europe’s empire nations. Rights of minorities that have been recognised 
under international  law serve to both preserve and protect  the group by 
restoring any land and cultural rights that may previously have been lost, or 
are  actively  under  threat  from their  dominant  majorities.  Given  that  in 
Africa, Africans who are also among the world’s most dispossessed exist 
128 Date-Bah, S.K. (1998) “Rights of Indigenous People in Relation to Natural 
Resources Development: An African’s Perspective”, Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resources Law, vol.16 No.4 pp.389 at 392.
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only as dominant numerical majorities, is it international law’s intention to 
deny them what rights it recognises for minorities on their territories even if 
the minorities are not native to those territories? Were that international 
law’s objective, few would find reason to believe in it. Because no other 
group right has been formulated that targets their particular situation, which 
it might be said is equally grave and urgent, interpretation of group rights 
under international law should reflect their situation too. From the outset 
the human rights movement has sought to restore dignity that persons had 
either  lost  or  were  threatened with losing.  The human rights movement 
targets  equity  in  the  enjoyment  by  any  population  of  its  basic  natural 
resources  and  opportunities.  If  this  is  correct,  then  juridically,  groups, 
including Africans that are neither indigenous nor minority groups in their 
own countries have historical land rights that ought to be accounted for. 
Brownlie129 writes that these rights manifest three special aspects. The first 
is that they “… do not cope with claims to positive action to maintain the 
cultural  and  linguistic  identity  of  communities  especially  when  the 
members  of  the  community  concerned  are  to  some  extent  territorially 
scattered”. The  Belgian Linguistics Case suggests that they impose no 
positive  duty  on  States  to  provide  subsidies  and  other  material 
underpinning to the rights protected.130 The second aspect is that they make 
exclusive claims in respect  of  specific areas.131  According to Brownlie, 
“This sets the land rights issue and the traditional ownership of a group, 
apart from the usual prescription of human rights on the basis of individual 
protection”.132 The third is that group rights are often based on the political 
and legal principle of self-determination.133 This study is concerned mainly 
with the second aspect though the third one is implicit in the land issue 
because  ultimately,  struggles  for  independence  in  the  SADC  relied  on 
restoration of land rights to recruit cadres to arms.
2.8. Zimbabwe’s trials and tribulations over the land issue
129 Brownlie, I. (1988) “The Rights of Peoples in Modern Interrnational Law”, in 
Crawford, J.  (ed) The Rights of Peoples, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.1 at 3.
130 Belgian Linguistics Case, European Court of Human Rights, Ser A No. 6 (1968)
131 Brownlie, I. (1988) “The Rights of Peoples in Modern Interrnational Law”, in 
Crawford, J.  (ed) The Rights of Peoples, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.1 at 4.
132 Ibid.
133 Discussing the range of political models possible, see Cassese, A. (1995) Self-
Determination of Peoples: A Legal Appraisal, Cambridge University Press.
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The murders in the name of re-acqusition of native title to land of David 
Stevens,  Talent  Mabika  and  Tichaona  Chiminya  on  15  April,134 Martin 
Olds  on  18  April,135 Alan  Dunn  on  8  May136 and  the  commission  of 
murders,  torture,  kidnapping  and  intimidation  of  opposition  party 
supporters every so often thereafter;137 and contempt of the rule of law,138 
and  the  siege  of  commercial  farmers  by  “war  veterans”139 raises  the 
question whether there is a genuine connection between the breakdown of 
law and order on the one hand, and the land issue that all Zimbabweans and 
the  international  community that  supported Zimbabwe’s  struggle  to  end 
Rhodesia’s  white  minority  rule,  and  later  to  rebuild  Zimbabwe 
acknowledge needs  to  be  resolved.  A series  of  events  suggests  there  is 
not.140 Rather, an issue, of paramount concern to all Zimbabweans appears 
to have been put to the service of political electioneering.141 But after all the 
murders, torture, rapes and abuse of the electorate have ceased, the issue 
will  still  be  unresolved  because  title  to  land  is  a  legal  concept  which 
confers standards of exclusivity which the current chaos can not conceive. 
The difficulty with Zimbabwe’s land crisis is not only one of expropriation 
of natives of their land during colonization but also of legal management of 
different concepts of titles to property created during colonization because 
the  underlying  philosophies  of  those  titles  appear  to  conflict  with  one 
anotherother.  The  distinction  between private  title  on the  one hand and 
communal title on the other is one that legally has to be attended so that 
acquisition and disposal of land occurs through a common process. This 
134 See “Farmer’s fate was sealed by car sticker”, The Times, 18th April 2000, p.1; 
CFU Report on the murder of David Stevens, 
http://www.samara.co.zw/cfu/farmininforbul.htm and “This is not racism, it’s 
Politics”, http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/2000apr/20apr-zim2.html
135 See “They wanted him out and wanted him dead”, The Times, 19th April 2000, 
p.5; 
136 See “Zimbabwe Farmer beaten to death”, 
http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/2000may1/8may-zim1.html
137 See “Five more Opposition Members Killed”, 
http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/2000may1/1may-zim2.html.
138 See “Blood on the Land”, Times, 18 April 2000, p.23.
139 See “Army set up Farm Occupations, says insider”, 
http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/2000may1/5may-zim.html
140 See Appendix 1: Chronology of events leading to Zimbabwe’s crisis of 2000, 
infra.
141 It is an open secret that “Were he (President Mugabe) to neutralise the land 
issue,  the  election  would  have  to  be  fought  on  corruption,  unemployment  and 
economic  disaster.  On  those  issues,  no  amount  of  gerrymandering  could  save 
ZANU-PF from humiliation”. The Times, “Blood on the land”, 18 April,  2000, 
p.23.
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book  concerns  itself  with  the  latter  difficulty.  Legally  attending  and 
resolving this distinction is a necessary part of the resolution strategy of 
this problem. However, current developments are hard pressed for evidence 
that  demonstrates  clear  policy  aimed  at  achieving  this.  Instead 
developments unfolding in Zimbabwe show that when communal title falls 
short  of  peasant  expectation,  forcible  collapse  of  private  title  follows 
immediately,  whatever  the  cause  of  that  collapse.  Communal  title 
presupposes that every Zimbabwean is destined in the 21st century to be a 
peasant farmer unless he/she can secure full time employment outside his 
peasant community. However, that is hardly the case. If “war veterans” and 
the squatters take over commercial farming land, what title do they obtain? 
With a population of 12 million, and a population growth rate of 3.1, how 
will land be allocated to the young adults ten years from now, and what sort 
of title will they obtain? 
In  the  determination  and  allocation  of  title  to  land,  humwe is 
limited in that it suffices only where there is surplus land, and those in need 
of it are guaranteed to find some.  Group membership is the basis of social 
rights that include access to land as a means of ensuring one’s subsistence. 
However,  when  there  is  no  more  surplus,  which  Zimbabwe’s  growing 
population threatens  to  make a  reality  soon,  another  land crisis  will  hit 
Zimbabwe because in the current crisis land issues are being played out as 
an  electioneering  strategy.142 Often  it  is  the  scarcity  of  a  good  that 
determines its value. Land would not have its enhanced qualities of utility 
if everyone had hectares of it to spare.  
2.9. Conclusion
This  chapter  considered  the  nature  of  title  to  real  property  before 
colonization of SADC communities. It established that pre-colonial SADC 
communities’  relationship  to  their  physical  environment:  land,  rivers, 
wildlife, etc – was summed up in the philosophy of common heritage – 
humwe,  according to which every member of the tribal group and larger 
community was presumed to hold an inherent right not only to earn a living 
off, but also to be supported in that effort by his kinsmen. This common 
heritage view of the physical environment humwe persists among Southern 
Africans to this day. Having been rejected by the foundationalist approach 
of successive colonial administrations in the region, who favoured private 
individual ownership of what was essentially communal property,  humwe 
142 See appendix I below, p.30.
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as the oppressed other143 appears to be bouncing back with similar force 
and brutality. In one sense the land issue in Zimbabwe and South Africa 
has  become  the  stage  on  which  resolution  is  to  be  addressed  of 
foundationalist  violence  of  enthroning  “x”  and  rejecting   “y” without 
justification.  Clearly our understanding of  “x” depends so much on the 
existence  of  “y” to  the  extent  that  the  former  would  not  make  sense 
without  the  latter.  It  is  that  interdependence  of  both  “x”  and  “y” that 
requires  in  any  social  ordering  practice,  application  of  critical 
foundationalism and not violent foundationalism typified in many of the 
social injustices that are rooted in colonial  or some such other similar 
historical  experience  of  developing  countries.  Critical  foundationalism 
requires reconciliation of “x” and “y” and not outright rejection of either. 
In  social  ordering  practices,  such  reconciliation  is  an  on-going  process, 
sometimes culminating in the firming over time of one of the two opposites 
and the disappearance of the other. This is certainly to be preferred over 
violent foundationalist tendencies that only nurture violence. 
This chapter observed that the land issue in affected SADC States 
appears  to  be  an  equal  and  opposite  reaction  to  the  legal  violence  that 
alienated native people from their land and forced them into wage earners 
from the new landlords and to be “squatters” in the land of their forefathers. 
Private title to commercial farmland, which also has the most agricultural 
potential, appears corrupt because of the violence inherent in its creation. 
Racism, coercion and dehumanisation of the native population are at the 
core of the corruption of the titles to commercial farmland. Thus, the native 
people’s  impatient  and  even  violent  agitation  for  re-allocation  of  land 
without  regard  to  race,  and  without  stigmatising  the  other  as  inferior 
appears noble. This is summed up in the slogan:
Landlessness = Racism
International law’s role in the resolution of this issue is made difficult in 
that it also sanctioned colonialism because then, the community of States 
that made the rules was the same that pursued the practice. Nonetheless, it 
would  be  a  big  leap  to  say  that  because  it  sanctioned  colonialism  it 
sanctioned also human rights  abuse unless  it  can be shown that  human 
rights  abuse  was  synonymous  with  colonization  of  other  territories.  By 
sanctioning slavery, did international law sanction also the rape of black 
143 Discussing deconstructionist normative theory, see Chigara, B. (2001) 
Legitimacy Deficit in Custom: A deconstructionist Critique, Ashgate, Aldershort, 
pp.18-1666.
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women by their masters? Again unless it can be shown that raping by a 
master of a slave was the same as slavery it may be difficult to impute to 
international law all the evils associated with that which it legitimated in 
the  past.  To its  credit,  international  law,  which  is  dependent  to  a  great 
extent on State practice, later prohibited both slavery and colonization of 
other territories. The human rights movement behind the sanctification of 
international law continues to grow in both stature and strength. It is to its 
strength that  nationals  of  all  jurisdictions  now look to  both under  their 
national  laws,  regional  laws,  and  international  laws.  Therefore,  even  in 
addressing the land issue, human rights issues appear best suited to head 
the list of considerations that should be had. While international law has 
clearly  ruled  that  native  people’s  pre-colonial  experience  titles  to  land 
subsisted through colonization and endured it except in a few special cases, 
restoration of those titles should still be informed by human rights of those 
whose titles appear inferior and must make way for those with title superior 
to theirs. 
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